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Governance in the health system has perhaps been the least explored building 
block of the health system, receiving less attention due to its vague definition and 
complex nature. When discussed at the country level it often focuses on single 
elements such as corruption or accountability and doesn’t consider wider 
interactions of relevance to how policies are formed. How well governed a health 
system is can often mean the difference between the efficient use of resources and 
inefficient waste, which is even more important in a resource constrained 
environment. 
 
The United Republic of Tanzania has been a major recipient of donor aid over the 
past few decades. Tanzania’s health sector in particular has been the subject of 
much donor interest, especially regarding medicines. One of the first donors to 
support medicines was Danida who funded the essential medicines kit, and since 
then numerous donors have been involved in either funding medicines, designing 
policies around medicines selection, procurement and distribution, or direct 
medicines donations. Although Tanzania has largely benefited from this increase in 
donor support, not all of it has been designed and implemented adequately to suit 
the situation and needs of Tanzania.  In other words, health systems governance 
may sometimes have been weakened by donor-interest, resulting in reduced 
quality of health care. 
 
The aim of this research was to contribute to a better understanding of health 
system governance and apply this knowledge to the Tanzanian health system. The 
insights gained should aid policy makers and other stakeholders to design 
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interventions that are appropriate for the local context to ensure a stronger health 
system which is able to attain its goals of improving the level and distribution of 
health, while responding to the population’s needs and protecting them from large, 
often catastrophic financial expenditures.  
 
The research was carried out as part of the Governance of Health Systems project, 
a collaborative endeavour between the Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute 
and the Basel Institute of Governance. Quantitative and qualitative methods were 
applied to data collected in two areas of the local Health and Demographic 
Surveillance System (HDSS), Ulanga District and Rufiji District. We used both 
primary data collection and secondary data, covering the period from 1999 – 2011.  
 
The overall findings are that despite the interest over the past decade to develop 
frameworks to assess governance in the health system, few have been empirically 
applied. The first part of this thesis focuses on developing a framework to assess 
governance in the health system; the second part applies this framework to a 
selected governance issue in Tanzania, namely the delivery of essential medicines 
to public health centres in Tanzania. At the national level, this investigation found 
that the medicines ordering system was based on a complex paper-based system 
which had not been designed with local capacity in mind, nor did it improve the 
accountability of medicines. Lack of accountability was also found at the health 
facility level, where over half of respondents interviewed who sought care in the 
public sector for fever, subsequently experienced the consequences of one form or 
another of non-compliant health-worker behaviour (overcharging for treatment and 
medicines, stocking out of the first line antimalarial, dispensing an inappropriate 
monotherapy). This resulted in an additional cost to the patient, on average, of 
USD1.62 per treatment episode, representing 125% of the national per capita daily 




Stockouts of essential medicines are an immediate indicator of governance failure 
and in the case of fully funded donor medicines, stockouts represent a health 
system failure. This research identified that in a 15 month period from October 
2011 until the end of 2012, an estimated 29% of health facilities were stocked out 
of the first line antimalarial at any one time. These stockouts were due to failures at 
the national and international level where excessive bureaucratic procedures 
resulted in fragmented and dysfunctional procedures for procurement of the first 
line antimalarial. 
 
The findings in this thesis suggest that Tanzania should redesign the medicines 
ordering system, with greater participation from health workers, in order to better 
understand the challenges they face. We recommend various interventions across 
the health system to strengthen it and improve the availability of medicines. The 
most important recommendation would be to increase accountability and 
transparency of the medicines delivery system and force reconciliation between 
data sources thereby creating information on medicines consumed. 
 
The findings of this thesis contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of 
governance in health systems and how overlooking governance can cause major 
catastrophic stockouts of essential medicines, in addition to a reduced level of 
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“Health systems approaches to aid may be intellectually correct, 
but they are politically problematic”  














 Understanding Health Systems Section 1.01
 
The establishment of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals in 2000 
coincided with an era when global health policy was becoming increasingly more 
complex with new challenges, new priorities, new players from private philanthropy 
and new global health initiatives and disease specific programs. As country health 
officials and donors increased their spending on health, concerns arose about the 
ability of health systems to effectively absorb this enormous increase in resources 
and deliver results. Partly in response to these developments, the World Health 
Organization  (WHO) focused its 2000 World Health Report on ‘Health Systems: 
Improving Performance’ which is widely considered as a landmark report across 
the health system literature, in part because it showcased the importance of 
focusing on health systems (WHO 2000a). In this report, the health system was 
defined as “all activities whose primary purpose is to promote, restore or maintain 
health”, and was presented as having four functions: stewardship; resource 
generation; financing; and service provision. The report also explicitly defined the 
goals of the health system as: 1) improving the health of the population they serve; 
2) responding to people’s expectations; and 3) providing financial protection 
against the cost of ill health (WHO 2000a). Moreover, the framework allows for an 
empirical assessment of health system performance which has been applied to 
compare the efficiency of national health systems across 191 countries (Evans et 
al. 2001). In addition, an in-depth analysis of the specific components of the 2000 
World Health Report incorporating different perspectives was also carried out by 
Murray and Evans (2003) (Murray and Evans 2003). 
 
 Since the 2000 World Health Report, health systems have been defined and 
conceptualised in various ways (see Table 1.1). Roberts et al. (2004) 
conceptualized the health system as a set of relationships between the major 
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components of the health system ‘control knobs’ and health system outcomes 
(Roberts et al. 2004). These control knobs include: financing; macro-organization of 
provision; payments; regulation; and persuasion. The ‘control knobs’ framework 
focused more on the financial aspects of a health system and less on building 
capacity in health workers; it also included consumer satisfaction as a goal. Mills et 
al. (2006) define a health system as having four functions: stewardship and 
regulation; organizational structures and their financing; general management 
functions, namely human resources; and quality assurance (Mills et al. 2006). This 
framework focuses on the relationship between the health system and its patients 
and their communities. It also provides special recommendations for low capacity 
environments including the provision of basic preventive and curative services and 
ensuring that disease specific programs have an element of health system 
strengthening.  
 
The WHO 2000 health system framework was later updated in 2007 with the 
release of the WHO report ‘Everybody's Business: Strengthening Health Systems 
to Improve Health Outcomes: WHO's Framework for Action’  (WHO 2007) where 
the health system architecture was further elaborated as having six building blocks: 
leadership and governance; health workforce; information; medical products, 
vaccines and technologies; financing; and service delivery (WHO 2007). This, 
however, was a shift away from the 2000 World Health Report as neither 
populations nor the importance of how the elements of a health system interact 
were highlighted. A year later, the WHO further developed their conceptual 
framework for primary health care by placing people in the centre of the health 
system (WHO 2008a). A further refinement of the WHO 2007 framework was 
proposed by de Savigny and Adam (2009) who highlighted the importance of 
incorporating a systems thinking view of the synergies and complex interactions 
among and across all building blocks in the health system (see Figure 1.1) (de 
Savigny and Adam 2009) This framework highlights the importance understanding 
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not only what was going on in each building block, but what happens in between 
them. It also emphasizes the importance of moving away from linear thinking 
towards understanding the importance of feedback loops.  
 
Figure 1.1: Rearranging the health system building blocks into a ‘systems 
thinking’ approach 
Source:  de Savigny and Adam (2009) 
 
In their framework, de Savigny and Adam (2009) highlight that any intervention in 
one building block of the health system is likely to have system-wide effects which 
may need to be mitigated or prevented. They also propose a ‘Ten Steps to System 
Thinking’ as a guide for the empirical application of systems thinking.  
 
Another framework rooted in systems thinking and highlighting the central role of 
people was developed by van Olmen et al. (2012) who expanded the building 
blocks to include four new elements: populations, context, goals and values (van 
Olmen et al. 2012). This framework emphasised that not all health system 
elements are equal, as well as the importance of considering complexity in strategy 




Differentiating between long term and intermediate goals, Atun and Menabde 
(2008) define the health system as being made up of elements that interact to 
achieve  health system goals around financial risk protection and consumer 
satisfaction, but there are also intermediate goals identified including: equity; 
efficiency; effectiveness and choice (Atun and Menabde 2008). This framework 
differs from the others in that it positions the health system within a wider context, 
emphasising the broader nature of the health system through its interactions, and 
dependency, on a wide variety of factors, including the demographic, economic, 
political, legal and regulatory, epidemiological, socio-demographic and 
technological contexts.  
 
The health system definitions and characteristics underlying the various initiatives 
identified in Table 1.1 have all served to focus attention on health systems, and on 
their various components and interactions. 
 
Table 1.1: Major health system definitions, frameworks and concepts since 
2000 
Conceptualisation Reference 
Health System Performance  (WHO 2000b) 
Essential Public Health Functions 
 (Pan American Health Organization 
2002) 
Control Knobs (Roberts et al 2004) 
Strengthening Health Systems (Mills et al 2006) 
Health System Building Blocks  (WHO 2007) 
Health Systems Dynamics (Atun and Menabde 2008) 
Maximizing positive synergies (WHO 2008a) 
Systems thinking for Health Systems 
Strengthening 
(de Savigny and Adam 2009) 
Monitoring Building Blocks of the Health 
System 
(WHO 2010a) 
Health Systems Dynamics (van Olmen et al 2012) 
 
The health system frameworks listed in Table 1.1 are useful guides to inform broad 
conceptual discussions; however, they are limited, in that they do not provide a 
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clear guide for health system practitioners within countries as to how to incorporate 
the health system in decision making and how to practically assess health system 
performance, or specific components of it. 
 
In parallel with this increased focus on conceptualising health systems in the 
literature, there has also been a growth in interest among the policy community 
around health systems. For example, the Alliance for Health Policy and Systems 
Research launched in 1999, the global symposia on health systems research (first 
held in Montreux in 2011) and the ‘International Health Partnership Plus’ aimed to 
align the efforts of international organisations, bilateral agencies and developing 
countries to develop sustainable health systems and improve aid effectiveness. 
More recently, the Health Systems Funding Platform by the World Bank, the GAVI  
Alliance and the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(henceforward referred to as the ‘Global Fund’), with facilitation from WHO, have 
attempted to streamline health system strengthening support according to country 
budgetary and programmatic cycles. However this funding platform never attained 
its goals due to different funding mechanisms between the three agencies and the 
financing crisis that the Global Fund experienced in 2011, cancelling Round 11 
funding applications (Hill et al. 2011).  
 
As expressed in 2012 by Richard Horton, the editor of the Lancet when he said 
“Health systems approaches to aid may be intellectually correct, but are politically 
problematic” (Horton 2012) the rate of application of health system frameworks has 
been considerably slower than their development. Moreover, questions have been 
raised as to whether global health initiatives, with narrow foci on disease or 
interventions, including the control of HIV/AIDS and malaria, and the promotion of 
vaccines, undermine health system development (Biesma et al. 2009;Hanefeld and 
Musheke 2009;Reich and Takemi 2009). Often, evaluations of  these and similar 
vertical programmes have tended to focus on single or specific elements like 
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human resource strengthening or financing, and  have neglected other components 
such as health information strengthening (Car et al. 2012). 
 
One of the more established health system toolkits for describing health systems 
and facilitating comparative health system research was developed by the 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, which published a 
template for Health Systems in Transition (HiT) country profiles to conceptualise 
health systems at the country level. These were initially focused on European 
countries, but were recently expanded to a selection of countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region including Fiji, the Philippines, Mongolia (Roberts et al. 2011;Romualdez et 
al. 2011;Tsilaajav et al. 2013) and Malaysia, under the newly-established Asia 
Pacific Health Systems Observatory. 
 
In 2010 the WHO produced a health system assessment toolkit with an indicative 
list of indicators to be collected at the country level. However, many of these 
indicators are very difficult to report on accurately (such as, the proportion of 
counterfeit drugs or under-the-table payments) (WHO 2010a). Furthermore, the 
indicators in the WHO (2010) report are limited to disease-specific or vertical 
programmes such as HIV/AIDS, reproductive health, malaria and tuberculosis, thus 
leaving out other key areas such as mental health. To my knowledge, this toolkit 
has not yet been applied. Perhaps to accelerate application, a rapid assessment 
tool covering the six dimensions of the health system as defined by WHO (2007) 
was developed by Islam (2007), and was designed to gather information on key  
indicators  during both desk reviews and interviews with key stakeholders (Islam 
2007) with the objective to inform USAID staff and Ministries of Health on the 
relative strengths and weakness of the health system, priority issues and potential 
reforms. The framework has so far been applied in Vietnam (Tran Thi Mai Oanh et 
al. 2010), Kenya (Luoma et al. 2010), Angola (Connor et al. 2010), South Sudan 
(Boulenger et al. 2007) and Ukraine (Tarantino et al. 2011). Both of these 
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frameworks provide a reasonable assessment toolkit for each of the health system 
building blocks, but their contribution towards assessing the complexity and 
dynamic nature of the health system is limited.   Further work is needed to 
stimulate and guide the discussion on how health systems are functioning in 
countries, and on the key impediments to their development. 
 
 Governance in Health Systems Section 1.02
 
Probably one of the least well understood and most complex functions of a health 
system, but one which is common to most health system frameworks, is the 
concept of governance. Each one of the health system frameworks listed in Table 
1.1 includes some mention of governance, either in terms of stewardship, 
regulation, organization arrangements, or enforcement or governance itself. In the 
WHO 2007 framework, governance is defined as “ensuring that strategic policy 
frameworks exist and are combined with effective oversight, coalition building, 
regulation, attention to system-design and accountability”. In other words, 
governance is seen as a core function that influences all the other elements of the 
health system.  
 
 Good health system governance has risen in importance as funding for health has 
increased and donors are demanding more accountability and transparency from 
recipients, especially following the findings of the Office of the Inspector General of 
the Global Fund (2011) (The office of the inspector general 2011). Governance in 
health has been discussed across various dimensions including global governance, 
corporate governance, governance in development and also how the private sector 
can be governed in providing public services.  However, as for health systems, 
much of the literature on governance is more conceptual and less concerned with 
practical ways and priorities for governing a health system. A substantial number of 
studies have discussed the various effects of selected aspects of governance on 
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the health sector (Brinkerhoff 2004;Brinkerhoff and Bossert 2008;Chaudhury et al. 
2006;Das Gupta et al. 2003;Lagomarsino et al. 2009;Nishtar 2010;Ramiro et al. 
2001;The Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria 2008;Transparency 
International 2006;Vian 2008;WHO 2009). Indeed, some studies have empirically 
assessed the magnitude and impact of certain governance elements on health 
sector performance (Gupta et al. 2000;Lewis 2006;Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008). 
In general, most of the literature on governance and health has focused on single 
elements of governance such as degree of government effectiveness, degree of 
corruption and community participation. Typically these components have been 
assessed against proxy indicators of health sector outcomes or performance such 
as immunization rates, percentage of low birth weight babies or levels of child 
mortality.  
 
Islam (2007) approaches the assessment of governance in the health system by 
developing a framework that proposes a set of illustrative questions to be answered 
by key stakeholders such as how information is used, how government coordinates 
donor inputs and who participates in setting the policy agenda. This framework 
provides a comprehensive range of issues to explore and even provides 
suggestions on which stakeholders to interview. Common governance challenges 
include fragmented roles and responsibilities, lack of participation from local health 
staff at sub-national level in policy making, and limited transparency and strategic 
vision (Boulenger et al 2007;Connor et al 2010;Luoma et al 2010;Tarantino et al 
2011;Tran Thi Mai Oanh et al 2010). Using a similar approach, the WHO (2010) 
toolkit to assess health systems included a governance module where they divide 
the assessment of governance in the health system into either rules-based or 
outcome-based indicators. Although important, asking about the ‘existence’ of such 
policies, says little about their implementation.  To my knowledge, there is no 





Lewis and Pettersson (2009) developed a list of governance indicators for health 
systems grouped into five topics: budget management; human resources; 
institutional providers; informal payments; and institutions. These indicators, 
together with questions on the design of incentives, allow the researcher to gain a 
more in-depth understanding of the governance challenges for that particular topic. 
The indicators are generic enough to allow for comparisons and are a mix of those 
which can be obtained easily (such as the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment – CPIA index) and those which are more challenging to collect such 
as the frequency of under-the-table payments. This framework too has not been 
applied in full in any country to date.   
 
Yet another health-systems specific governance framework was developed by 
Siddiqi et al (2009). The authors adapt the UNDP good governance concept 
(United Nations Development Programme 1997) to suggest a framework which 
encompasses ten health system governance principles to assess governance of 
the health system, and outlines a set of questions to be asked at different 
implementation levels.  Their analytical framework has been applied to assess 
health system governance in Pakistan and identified several areas of weakness 
such as lack of accountability at the national level and little strategic vision in 
designing policies. 
 
A sector-specific governance assessment toolkit has been designed for medicines 
(‘Good Governance for Medicines’) developed by WHO which focuses entirely on 
the pharmaceutical sector (WHO 2009). The aim of this toolkit is to evaluate 
transparency in the sector and is accompanied by a guide on how to assess 
responses, thus reducing the possibility of subjective judgement. This assessment 
has been applied in 26 countries including: Bolivia; Cambodia; Jordan; Indonesia; 
Mongolia; and Papua New Guinea. Most of these frameworks provide ‘snapshots’ 
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of the state of governance in health systems by developing both quantitative and 
qualitative indicators. This is advantageous as they can highlight areas of possible 
gross weakness; for example, if a country has no recent essential medicines list, or 
if there are irregularities in the payroll for health workers, or a lack of transparency 
in resource allocation. However, it is likely that health system stewards would 
already know where these governance weaknesses are and instead need to better 
understand why, where, and how to intervene.   
 
Assessing and understanding governance in the health system is crucial as public 
officials, donors and researchers strive to understand how to improve the 
performance of health systems.  The concept of governance in health systems has 
evolved from a complex and often neglected issue in health policy debates to one 
which now features regularly in discussions and has motivated new research.  
However a practical tool which can be readily and reliably used by policy makers to 
assess governance across the health system has, until now, not been developed. 
 
 Health Systems in Tanzania  Section 1.03
 
Tanzania is a developing country  classed as a low income country by the World 
Bank with a per capita income of USD473 in 2011 (The World Bank 2012). The 
health system in Tanzania services an estimated population of approximately 46 
million, with an annual growth rate of 3%, with the majority of the population living 
in rural areas (73%) (The World Bank 2012). Tanzania is experiencing health 
system challenges that typically arise due to resource constraints, as summarised 





Table 1.2: Indicators across health system building blocks, Tanzania and 

















16 60 n/a 31 n/a 
Financing 
Health Exp as % 
of GDP 
7.3 4.5 9.5 6.6 6.5 
Service 
delivery 
Children with fever 
receiving 
antimalarial drugs 
(% of children 
under 5 with fever) 
59.1 23.0 64.5 29.9 36.9 
 
The quality of health care in Tanzania is compromised by an unskilled and 
extremely scare health workforce compared to its neighbours. The low number of 
qualified physicians in Tanzania is due to both an employment freeze in the 1990’s 
and persistent underinvestment in training of health staff (Sikika 2010). The Health 
Information System (HIS) (MTUHA as it is known in Tanzania) was developed in 
the early 1990’s (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Tanzania 2010a) and 
requires health facilities to manually record data in 12 booklets which contain forms 
and registers. This information is summarised quarterly and submitted to the district 
where it is computerised and made accessible at the regional level. As the HIS was 
deemed inadequate for some large programmes, a number of parallel vertical 
information systems for specific diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Leprosy were subsequently developed (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
Tanzania 2007a). Vital registration is low in Tanzania, in part because fees are 
required to obtain both birth and death certificates. The share of government 
expenditure for health as a percentage of total government expenditure in 
2009/2010 was 6.5%, a reduction from 2005/2006 when it was 6.7% (Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare Tanzania 2010b) and still a long way off the Abuja target 
of 15%.  Total health in 2009/2010 was 8.2% of Gross Domestic Product with a per 
  
13 
capita amount of USD41 in the same period (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
Tanzania 2010b). The majority of public health expenditures were financed by the 
donors (39.6%), followed by private expenditure (34.4%) and with public 
expenditure making up the remaining 26% (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
Tanzania 2010b). Donor funding is focused mainly on malaria and HIV/AIDS, 
where donor contributions in 2009/2010 represent 40% and 70%, respectively, of 
the total health expenditure for each of these diseases  (Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare Tanzania 2010b). 
 
Despite resource limitations, Tanzania has achieved remarkable success in 
improving child health, with under-five mortality declining by 65% from 1990 to 
2010 (Lozano et al. 2011). However, these gains have not been repeated in adults, 
with death rates among females aged 25-29 years, for example  increasing  by 
71% over the same period (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2010b). The 
burden of disease in the country is still dominated by communicable diseases with 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and lower respiratory infections being the leading causes of 
disease burden in Tanzania (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2010b).   
 
Health services in the public sector are provided by a network of hospitals (101), 
health centres (404) and dispensaries (3715). In the private sector they are 
provided by Non - Governmental Organisations (NGO), laboratories and private 
clinics, as well as a mixture of hospitals, health centres and dispensaries (total of 
1767). The health system is decentralised, although certain functions, such as 
financing for medicines, have remained centralised.  
 
 Delivery of medicines Section 1.04
 
The accessibility of medicines across the country is an important indicator of the 
quality of service delivery and a contributing factor to the health system goal of 
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improving both the level and distribution of health. Medicines stockout is also a 
common indicator across frameworks to measure governance in the health system, 
and is especially important for certain essential medicines. In Tanzania. 
Expenditure on pharmaceuticals is estimated at 18% of public health expenditure in 
2009/2010 (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Tanzania 2011). However, this 
figure is likely to be an underestimate as it doesn’t capture expenditure from donors 
who do not go through the government (such as the US President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief –PEPFAR and the President’s Malaria Initiative -PMI) nor over 
the counter expenditure on pharmaceuticals which is recorded in the National 
Health Accounts. Using information from these various sources, I estimate that in 
2010, pharmaceutical expenditure is more likely to be closer to 30% of total health 
expenditure in Tanzania (see footnote 1 in Chapter 4).  Due to the significant 
expenditure on medicines and for the various reasons discussed above, this thesis 
has focused on the topic of medicines and investigates the health system factors 
that influence their availability. In addition, the delivery of medicines in Tanzania 
has recently changed from a “push” to a “pull” system, thereby further emphasising 
the need to study how the new medicines delivery system has been integrated into 
the health system.  
 
Essential Drug program Kit (“push” system) 1983 - 2008 
Since the 1990’s Tanzania’s health sector like the rest of the country has been 
going through a process of decentalization (Semali et al. 2007), however, 
medicines and other supplies have remained centrally provided. Prior to 2008, 
these were provided as standard, pre-packed Essential Drug Program (EDP) “kits” 
to all health facilities (excluding hospitals) from the Medical Stores Department 
(MSD), a semi-autonomous, non-profit department under the Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare (MoHSW). Kits were coloured either blue or yellow depending on 
the level of health facility (dispensary or health centre, respectively) (Amenyah et 
al. 2005). Kits were designed to last a month and as they were procured pre-
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packed from both international and national suppliers (Euro Health Group 2007a), 
the MSD only had to manage up to four variants (Center for Pharmaceutical 
Management 2003).  The standardized nature of the kits, however meant that in 
some areas certain medicines were depleted at a faster rate, causing stockouts or 
accumulated surpluses due to differences in catchment areas and disease burdens 
(Amenyah et al 2005;Center for Pharmaceutical Management 2003;COWI et al. 
2007).  
 
Indent/Integrated Logistics System (“pull” system) 2004 -present 
In early 2000 the Pharmaceutical Supply Section (PSS) within the MoHSW 
designed a new “pull” system (indent) which included 70 essential medicines and 
allowed health facilities (excluding hospitals) to specifically order individual 
medicines. Vertical programs such as family planning and specific disease control 
programs including sexually transmitted infections, malaria and HIV, remained 
independent and developed their own individual supply chains.  Under the indent 
system, health facilities were required to estimate quarterly consumption (current 
‘stock on hand’ subtracted from quarterly monthly consumption) for the 70 items 
and to place quarterly medicines orders through the district office. The indent 
system meant that the MSD moved away from supplying four stock items, to 
individually packing 70 products in the orders for over 3000 health facilities every 
month (Center for Pharmaceutical Management 2003). As with the kit system, 
health facilities were almost entirely dependent on the MSD for medicines supplies; 
a study carried out in 2005/2006 found little difference in medicines availability 
between the two systems (Euro Health Group 2007a).  
 
 In 2005, the MoHSW expanded the indent “pull” system to include all vertical 
programs under the umbrella of the Integrated Logistics System (ILS) and rolled it 
out nationally in 2009. The Expanded Program of Immunization and the National 
Tuberculosis and Leprosy Programs were excluded however, as they were 
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deemed to perform well under their own vertical programs (Amenyah et al 2005). 
The ILS introduced a new ordering system of 12 forms to be completed by health 
facilities, the Request and Report (R&R) form. The R&R form is used for quarterly 
ordering of around 100 pre-determined priority medicines and contains a fixed 
algorithm which requires data from stock ledgers, together with physical counts of 
inventory, to estimate presumed quarterly consumption which is subsequently used 
to estimate the quantity needed. Health facilities order for seven months in 
advance: for the three months in a quarter, plus two months to allow for the MSD 
and District processing time and the remaining two  months as a buffer stock to 
account for any increases in consumption due to seasonal disease  patterns and 
any delays in ordering (Amenyah et al 2005). The ILS therefore increased both the 
number of medicines ordered and the complexity of the ordering formula. 
 
The DMO is required to check R&R forms for calculation errors before submitting a 
copy to MSD. Copies of the R&R form are kept at the health facility, the office of 
the DMO and the MSD. At the district level, health facilities are divided into three 
ordering groups submitting R&R forms for the quarter in different months at 
different periods to ease the packaging and processing load at the MSD. 
 
Funds for the purchase of medicines are a combination of the district block grant 
(from government) and a “basket fund” (from donors). Allocation of funds for 
medicines purchase is based on the size of the service population and health 
facility type. Based on the recommendations of the PSS, funds are released 
quarterly by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA) to health facility 
accounts in the MSD via the MoHSW.  Funding for medicines is based on a 
revolving fund, whereby once health facilities place orders with the MSD, the funds 
are released from the individual accounts and transferred to the MSD working 
capital which can be used for future procurement. The MSD finances its operating 
costs by charging a 17.4% mark-up on all medicines and supplies, except for 
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vertical programs where the overhead is lower, at 14% (Euro Health Group 2007b). 
Health facilities therefore rely almost entirely on delivery from the MSD which, in 
turn, is reliant on the timely and complete allocation of funds from the MoHSW, 
which in turn relies on the release of funds from the MoFEA. 
 
Examining the governance issues around the delivery of medicines is crucial as 
medicines are not only are a life saving commodity but they are also a tangible 
commodity and can be easily diverted. Governance challenges in the delivery of 
medicine are a global problem (The Economist 2012), both with regard to where 
fake or counterfeit medicines are found, but also with regard to the supply chain 
within which these medicines are produced and how they cross international 
boarders. Several international bodies have been designed to address the issue of 
counterfeit medicines including the WHO’s International Medical Products Anti-
Counterfeiting Taskforce, and the Medicrime convention signed in 2011 by 19 
European countries. At the national level, various reports have studied the 
availability and traceability of essential medicines in Tanzania and have illuminated 
areas of concern (Euro Health Group 2009;GIZ and Tanzanian German 
Programme to Support Health TGPSH 2011a;Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
Tanzania 2009;The Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria 2009b). 
The Global Fund Audit report carried out in 2009  in three regions focusing on five 
Global Fund grants that cover HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria identified 
capacity shortcomings and lack of coordination which in the case of malaria, 
simultaneously resulted in an oversupply of ACT (creating expired stock), stockouts 
of ACT at the health facility level and a large unaccounted amount of ACT (The 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria 2009b).  The 2009 Euro 
Health report carried out in two regions identified failures at the national level in 
terms of flow of funds, with budget disbursement being erratic, delayed and often 
incomplete. Medicines forecasting and procurement were also identified as areas 
of weakness (Euro Health Group 2009). The 2011 GIZ report carried out in four 
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regions found severe shortages of several essential medicines and Rapid 
Diagnostic Test (RDTs) at the health facility level. They identified the main causes 
to be poor completion of medicines requests at  the MSD and lack of capacity at 
the health facility level to complete medicines orders (GIZ and Tanzanian German 
Programme to Support Health TGPSH 2011a).   
 
 Malaria policy  Section 1.05
 
Challenges in access to essential medicines become even more important when 
the medicines are used for treatment against a major public health consequence 
such as malaria. Malaria is a leading public health concern in Tanzania, especially 
for children under the age of five and for pregnant women (Tanzania Commission 
for AIDS (TACAIDS) et al. 2012). According to the latest Tanzania HIV/AIDS and 
Malaria Indicator Survey  (THMIS) 2011-2012, the prevalence of malaria in children 
under five was 9% (when tested with RDTs (Tanzania Commission for AIDS 
(TACAIDS) et al 2012), although this reflects a considerable  reduction compared 
to the 2007 – 2008 THMIS which found that 18% of children under five tested 
positive for malaria (Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS) et al. 2008). 
Malaria prevalence increased with age in under-fives and large regional variations 
exist. Expenditure on malaria accounts for 19.4% of total health expenditure and 
1.6% of GDP in Tanzania (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Tanzania 2010b) 
although the domestic budget for malaria activities has fallen by around 30% since 
2005 (The Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria 2009a). The 
disease places a large burden on the health sector, accounting for around 40% of 
out-patient department visits in 2008 (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
Tanzania 2008a). Chloroquine was used as the first line antimalairal in Tanzania 
since the 1960s, as it was readily available in both the public and private sectors at 
low cost (Kitua 1999), until 1999 when its high  failure rate (42%) forced the 
government to change its national malaria treatment policy to sulphadoxine – 
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pyrimethamine (SP), banning cholorquine (Eriksen et al. 2005). Following 
recommendations by WHO, Tanzania again changed its malaria policy in late 2006, 
deciding that the first line antimalarial for uncomplicated malaria in Tanzania would 
be an artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) - artemether lumefantrine (Alu) 
(Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2005).  Given the high cost of ACT, 
Tanzania was granted USD75 million from the Global Fund during its Round 4 
disbursements in 2005 (and currently through Round 9) to purchase ACTs for use 
in the public sector. 
 
Malaria expenditure by donors has doubled as a proportion of total malaria 
spending, from 18% in 2005/2006 to 40% in 2009/2010; concurrently, public sector 
contributions to control malaria have declined from 37% in 2002/2003 to 19% in 
2009/2010 (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Tanzania 2010b). According to 
the 2010 National Health Accounts, there is no (0.0%) government public spending 
on pharmaceuticals for malaria (ACT)  (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
Tanzania 2010b). Tanzania’s National Malaria Control Programme (NMCP) is 
responsible for forecasting ACT demand and managing Global Fund grants for 
malaria (President's Malaria Initiative 2012). The MSD handles ACT procurement, 
storage and distribution together with other medicines (Boex and Msemo 2007). 
Health facilities order ACT along with other medicines via ILS (Amenyah et al 
2005). ACTs are provided at no charge to the health facility and, according to 
policy, are dispensed free to children under the age of five and to adults over 60 
years of age (Mubyazi 2004). Those covered by a health insurance fund (National 
Health Insurance Fund or the Community Health Fund)  (www.nhif.or.tz/) are also 
exempt from payment at the health facility (Chee et al. 2002;Humba 2011).  Others 
pay a user fee of TZS1,000 (USD0.70) (2007 fee) (Mushi 2007). According to the 
Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses Guidelines, ACTs are given as a 
presumptive treatment in the absence of diagnostic tests when a child presents 
with fever without other symptoms such as rapid breathing or other respiratory 
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symptoms which could indicate pneumonia or a common cold (WHO and UNICEF 
2005).  
 
 In addition to ACT, SP is recommended as an intermittent  preventive treatment 
during pregnancy and quinine is used as a second-line treatment when no ACT is 
available and is also administered to pregnant women in their first trimester 
(National Malaria Control Programme 2006).  These monotherapies, together with 
others, are widely found on the private market but are often of poor quality and 
consequently less effective (AMFm Independent Evaluation Team 2012)  To 
remove these monotherapies from private sale, an innovative financing 
mechanism, the Affordable Medicines Facility – malaria (AMFm) was trialled in 
seven countries, one of which was Tanzania (others being Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria and Uganda) . AMFm is hosted and managed by the 
Global Fund and has four objectives, to increase the availability, affordability, 
market share and use of quality-assured ACTs. It operates at a national scale in 
private facilities, both for profit and not-for-profit, and also in the public sector. 
AMFm negotiates price reductions with ACT manufactures and provides a co-
payment to ACT manufactures and subsidies to countries together with supporting 
interventions such as training and community outreach (AMFm Independent 
Evaluation Team 2012). After the first year of implementation, there is evidence 
that Tanzania has largely achieved these goals for AMFm. 
 
With the availability of a selection of technologies to prevent (bed nets, indoor 
residual spraying), diagnose (RDTs) and treat (ACT) malaria, all of which are 
nearly entirely funded by donors, the fact that Tanzania, along with its neighbours 
such as Kenya (Kangwana et al. 2009b), Uganda (Zurovac et al. 2008) and Zambia 
(Zurovac et al. 2007a) have been experiencing public sector ACT stockouts over 
the past five years (GIZ and Tanzanian German Programme to Support Health 
TGPSH 2011a;Kangwana et al. 2009a;President's Malaria Initiative 2012;The 
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Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria 2009b;The PLoS Medicine 
Editors 2009), is a clear indication of health system failure to deliver both 
preventative and curative treatment against the second largest cause of premature 
mortality in the country (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2010b). 
 
 Rationale Section 1.06
 
 
Health is a basic human right and health systems have a responsibility to their 
citizens to deliver safe, effective medicines at the right price, time and quantity to 
those in need. In order to meet these goals, health system stewards are required to 
design systems that facilitate both access and use of quality medicines through 
public sector health facilities. A clear indicator of health system failure is when 
tangible resources such as health staff, medicines or supplies are missing.   
 
Discussions around health systems have dominated the global health agenda for 
over a decade with a wealth of contributions towards defining and assessing health 
systems and their governance. This has been accompanied by a major shift in 
donor thinking around the importance of investing in health systems to achieve 
population health gains. The importance of understanding health systems 
dynamics becomes increasingly apparent when countries like Tanzania, who 
receive substantial aid and attention from the donor community, are still unable to 
offer a complete level of basic care, thereby hampering efforts towards universal 
coverage. This thesis will attempt to identify the important underlying factors in the 
governance of the health system in Tanzania that contribute to reduced access to, 
and efficiency of, health care services. 
 
The principal findings of the thesis are presented in Chapters 3, 4 5 and 6 , in the 
form of a series of journal articles which bring together in a coherent fashion the 
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body of research on health system governance in Tanzania. Chapter 3 begins by 
reviewing the literature about the role of governance in the health sector, and 
identifies the principal characteristics of these various frameworks that have been 
proposed, beginning with the seminal framework put forward by WHO in it’s 2000 
World Health Report. We propose an alternative approach to assessing 
governance issues, built around the identification of a specific governance issue 
and tracing its effects via a systems thinking framework. In Chapter 4, we examine 
the implications of the major changes in medicines delivery systems in Tanzania 
over the past decade with the previous “push” system being replaced by a “pull” 
system. We conclude that this change has not resulted in a material gain in the 
delivery of essential medicines, focusing on selected tracer conditions. In Chapter 
5, we assess the causes underlying stockouts of the key first-line antimalarial in 
Tanzania taken as a specific and important consequence of weak health system 
governance in the country, particularly in the light of seemingly adequate supply of 
medicines from major donors such as the Global Fund. Finally, in Chapter 6, we 
examine in greater detail the consequences of governance, as reflected by lack of 
accountability at the health facility level, on out of pocket payments for already poor 
households in Tanzania. 
 
These various findings about the availability of essential medicines in Tanzania 
raise a number of questions, including why are there stockouts of a fully donor 
funded essential medicine – ACT? What might be the contribution of national and 
international factors to this pattern of stockouts? And what might be the impact of 
such stockouts on the health and economic well being of households in Tanzania? 
This thesis sets out to answer these questions and to contribute to a better 












“We need more money for health, but we need to deliver more 
health for the money” 















2. Aims and Objectives 
 
  Aims  Section 2.01
 
Specifically, this study aims to contribute to the literature on health system 
governance by improving the conceptualisation of governance within the health 
system based on a systems approach to understanding medicine supply issues. It 
also expands on the current literature by looking at international influences that 
affect the delivery of essential medicines in Tanzania and the downstream impact 
on households of some of these decisions.   
 
The insights learned from this research should help identify areas of weakness and 
guide the development of health system strengthening interventions in Tanzania, 
and possibly in other countries facing similar concerns.  
 
 Objectives Section 2.02
 
The overarching goal of the work encompassed in this thesis is to demonstrate the 
importance of taking a systems perspective when evaluating specific health system 
challenges. We also propose simple, operational methods that could be applied to 
reconcile data in order to create useful information for policy makers and stewards 
of the health system.  
This thesis has two broad objectives: 
 
 Objective 1: To define a framework for the assessment of governance within 
a health system 
Within this objective, we define a series of more specific objectives; namely to 
ensure that: 
 the framework takes a comprehensive health systems approach 
 the framework is practical, and 
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 the framework can be empirically applied 
 
Objective 2: To empirically apply the framework in Tanzania  
In this case, the specific objectives are to: 
 select a pertinent governance issue affecting the health system in Tanzania 
and apply the framework to it 
 discuss key governance challenges identified from using the health system 
framework, and 
 provide suggestions for future governance interventions  
 
The first research thrust will therefore be to develop a framework that incorporates 
the latest health systems thinking, highlighting key areas of governance. This will 
be followed by the application of this framework to the issue of essential medicines 
availability in Tanzania. Following this, we focus on the availability of the fully 
donor-funded first line antimalarial and propose reasons why stockouts occurred 
and how they could be prevented. This will also include an analysis of the 
behaviour of households during antimalarial stockout when they are seeking care 
for fever.  
 
 Study areas  Section 2.03
 
Tanzania was selected as a country case study for this research. Tanzania’s 
mainland is composed of 132 districts and 24 regions. This study focuses on two 
districts in South East Tanzania, the Rufiji District in the Pwani Region, and the 
Ulanga District in the Morogoro Region (Figure 2.1). Twelve of the 65 villages in the 
Ulanga District form part of the Ifakara Health and Demographic Surveillance Site 
(HDSS)  that was set up in 1996 (Armstrong Schellenberg et al. 2002). Data on 
health facility out-patient numbers, medicines consumption, antimalarial stock 
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counts, household expenditure during care-seeking for fever, and household assets 
were collected from 2009 – 2011.   
 
The Ulanga district has an estimated population of 265,203 according to the 2012 
census, with a malaria parasite prevalence rate in children under five years as 
tested by RDT of 13.0% in 2011 (Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS) et al 
2012).  The Rufiji District had an enumerated population of 217,274 with a malaria 
parasite prevalence rate in 2011 in children under the age of five as tested by RDT 
of 10.2% (Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS) et al 2012).  
 
Within both Districts, health services are provided by a mixture of government and 
private health centres, together with a plethora of private retailers including 
Accredited Drug Dispensing Outlets (ADDO) and general shops. As both districts 
are in close proximity to the capital, they both use the central MSD for packaging 
and delivery of medicines.  
 









The International Network for the Demographic Evaluation of Populations and Their 
Health (INDEPTH) Effectiveness and Safety Studies of Antimalarials in Africa 
(INESS) were designed with the objective to provide decision makers at the 
national and international level with independent and objective evidence on  the 
safety and the effectiveness of new antimalarial medicines to enhance malaria 
treatment policy in Africa (INDEPTH Network 2011). INESS undertakes Phase IV 
studies of new combination therapies for malaria in at least eight INDEPTH HDSS 
sites in four African countries to provide longitudinal evidence on antimalarial 
efficacy in real life settings. In Tanzania the study drug is the first line antimalarial 
ACT, Coartem. The INESS project also tracks costs and health seeking behaviour 
during a fever episode. 
 
In Ulanga, longitudinal survey data was collected on household costs drawing on 
the INESS methodology with data collection starting in September 2009 until 
present (INDEPTH Network 2011). Rolling daily household surveys in the Ifakara 
HDSS identify fever episodes using a two-week recall whereby a randomly pre-
selected group are chosen for an in-depth questionnaire about their health-related 
behaviour and expenditures. Data on individual treatment-seeking pathways, 
access to treatment, outcomes, outpatient numbers and household costs are 
captured, together with other key indicators such as the different treatments and 
sources of medicines, as well as the total cost. Direct financial costs include direct 
medical costs including consultation fees, prescription fees, and charges for 
medicines, together with non-medical costs associated with seeking care for fevers 
such as transport, accommodation, food, water and mobile phone use, together 
with any gift payments. 
 
In the Ifakara HDSS, households are visited three times a year and once a year an 
asset survey is administered. The socio-economic status of the households was 
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defined using Principle Components Analysis (PCA) (Filmer and Pritchett 
2001;Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006) based on 15 dichotomous variables. The 
index was constructed for 5,676 of the households from the following dichotomous 
variables: ownership of a bicycle (65% of households); radio (69%); mobile phones 
(43%); watch (6%) and iron (5%); living in rented accommodation (11%); as well as 
various characteristic of the dwelling such as: mud floor (83%); cement floor (9%); 
stone walls (33%); brick walls (6%); grass roof (9%); tin roof (1%); kerosene fuel 
(20%); electricity (2%) and type of sanitary facilities including presence of a toilet 
(94%).  The first principle component explained 23% of the variability in socio 
economic scores. Greatest weight was given to ownership of a cement floor (0.38), 
the use of kerosene for cooking fuel (0.34) and ownership of a mobile phone (0.30). 
Households were classified into wealth quintiles based on their PCA sores and 
assigned their own socio-economic score index. Household and health facility 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) coordinates were also collected.  
 
SMS for Life 
In 2009 an initiative based on mobile phones was launched to investigate stockouts 
of the first line antimalarial Coartem led by the pharmaceutical company Novartis, 
and piloted in three districts in rural Tanzania. SMS for Life trained and engaged 
health workers to use their mobile telephones to respond to weekly SMS messages 
reporting on the Coartem stock levels in their storage rooms (Barrington et al. 
2010a). It also mapped health facilities so that district managers could be informed 
about stock distribution of all four dosages of Coartem. The system is based on 
asking local health workers to use their personal phones, and sending them a 
credit when they reported back within a certain time frame. The SMS for Life 






Health Facility Information 
Data on out-patient department numbers, together with the principle disease for 
which they were treated, as well as medicines dispensed were collected from 
health facility books under two programs. One of these falls under the routine HIS 
which requires health facility workers to report yearly summaries of the number of 
outpatients treated for various diseases collected and collated in Book 2. The other 
data collection system used in this study is based on the forms from the medicines 
delivery system which recorded the amount of medicines dispensed and 
consumed.  
 
 Data entry and analysis Section 2.04
 
All data were doubled entered and cleaned.  Univariate logistic regression analysis 
of ACT stockouts on malaria prevalence (see chapter 5) was carried out using 
Stata 10 and found a highly significant relationship with the slope = 0.88 and a (CI: 
0.13 – 1.44), (p=0.004).  
 
Student’s t-Test was used to compare differences in means in household 
expenditure between seeking treatment for fever in the public and the private 
sector and yielded a t statistic of 1.26  (p=0.21).  
 
Health facility catchment areas were determined using  the ArcGIS software 
(ArcGIS 2012) to create 1km Euclidian buffers around health facilities.  
 
Confidence intervals (CI) were calculated using the Confidence Interval Analysis 
tool to quantify the uncertainty of estimates (as seen in chapters 4 and 6). This 
allows a more informative presentation of results than just using p values which can 
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“What we know for sure is that donated products, which are 
supposed to be given free to clinics, are not reaching patients 
and are being stolen and diverted”  
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 Abstract  Section 3.01
 
As countries strive to strengthen their health systems in resource constrained 
contexts, policy makers need to know how best to improve the performance of their 
health systems. To aid these decisions, health system stewards should have a 
good understanding of how health systems operate in order to govern them 
appropriately. While a number of frameworks for assessing governance in the 
health sector have been proposed, their application is often hindered by unrealistic 
indicators or they are overly complex resulting in limited empirical work on 
governance in health systems. This paper reviews contemporary health sector 
frameworks which have focused on defining and developing indicators to assess 
governance in the health sector. Based on these, we propose a simplified approach 
to look at governance within a common health system framework which 
encourages stewards to take a systematic perspective when assessing 
governance. Although systems thinking is not unique to health, examples of its 
application within health systems have been limited. We also provide an example 
of how this approach could be applied to illuminate areas of governance 
weaknesses which are potentially addressable by targeted interventions and 
policies. This approach is built largely on prior literature, but is original in that it is 
problem-driven and promotes an outward application taking into consideration the 
major health system building blocks at various levels in order to ensure a more 
complete assessment of a governance issue rather than a simple input-output 
approach. Based on an assessment of contemporary literature we propose a 
practical approach which we believe will facilitate a more comprehensive 
assessment of governance in health systems leading to the development of 
governance interventions to strengthen system performance and improve health as 




 Governance in the health sector Section 3.02
 
Low- and middle-income countries are in an era of unprecedented expansion of 
financial resources for health, both from development assistance and government 
spending (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2010a).  However, during the 
recent financial crisis, many donors and governments cut back funding for health 
(Feachem et al. 2010a), requiring health system stewards to pay more attention to 
the traceability of fund allocations. Although funding levels can significantly 
influence health system performance, a large part of the variation in health system 
performance across countries cannot be entirely explained by conventional factors 
such as resource allocation (financial, human, technical).  Rather, a deeper 
exploration of governance mechanisms such as  formal rules and informal customs 
could explain some of these differences. Governance has been studied in various 
dimensions including global governance (Bradford and Linn 2007;Finkelstein 
1995), governance of the private sector in offering public services (Salamon 2002), 
corporate governance (OECD 2004) and governance for development (de Ferranti 
et al. 2009;Kaufmann et al. 1999)  There has also been an increasing interest in 
understanding the relationship between governance and health at the global level 
through discussions on global health governance (GHG) (Fidler 2007;Hein et 
al.;Lee K 2011;Ng and Ruger 2011), together with the development of theoretical 
frameworks for defining and measuring general governance (Arndt and Oman 
2006;Kaufmann et al 1999;United Nations Development Programme 1997). 
Corresponding to this, there has been an increased interest in the assessment of 
governance in the health sector. This is particularly important considering the 
characteristics of the health sector such as asymmetry of information and influence 
among the growing number of health system stakeholders (Savedoff 2006) who 
have specific interests and different positions of power which may affect policy 
development (Walt and Gilson 1994). This has been particularly dynamic over the 
past decade with the rapid growth in the number of global health initiatives and 
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their agents at country level. Therefore much conceptual thinking has gone into 
governance, especially from a political science perspective. It is not the intention of 
this paper to further contribute to the discourse in this area as, at least for health, 
this has been done by others (Brinkerhoff and Bossert 2008;Fattore and Tediosi 
2010;Savedoff 2009). Instead we aim to provide examples of how these often 
theoretical considerations could be applied to health system governance. We build 
on previous literature to develop a modified approach to assess select governance 
elements within the health system with a view to guiding health system-level 
interventions. This approach is aimed towards health sector stewards and 
practitioners who wish to understand potential governance issues within their 
health system and require a practical tool to do so.  
 
 Governance in health systems Section 3.03
 
Furthering the discourse on governance is important as this topic is often neglected 
in international and national debates due to its complex and sometimes sensitive 
nature. The complex nature is underlined by the numerous definitions of 
governance and how it differs from management. We use the WHO (2007) 
definition of governance, namely “ensuring strategic policy frameworks exist and 
are combined with effective oversight, coalition-building, the provision of 
appropriate regulations and incentives, attention to system-design, and 
accountability” (WHO 2007). Therefore, good governance from that perspective is 
understood to be policy- centric including consideration of all actors who exert an 
impact on the health system together with the various incentives which influence or 
regulate the system and stakeholder behaviours, though transparent rules 
overseen by strong accountability links. Improving the understanding of 
governance is especially important in less developed countries whose health 
systems are sometimes congested by numerous externally driven health initiatives, 
who do not necessarily work together or respect country priorities (Ooms et al. 
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2010) and who need to manage a plethora of stakeholders who influence policies. 
Governance also incorporates management which is concerned with implementing 
policies and decisions (Fattore and Tediosi 2010). The importance of governance 
in health systems is evident from the fact that most conceptualisations and 
descriptions of health systems developed over the past decade refer to aspects of 
governance, either in terms of stewardship, regulation, oversight or governance 
itself (Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1: Chronology of major health system definitions, frameworks and 
concepts 
 




First emphasis on stewardship as a health system function (WHO 2000b) 
Essential Public 
Health Functions 
Strengthening public health regulation and enforcement 






Regulation as one of the health system control knobs to 
improve performance 




Strengthening health system capacity by focusing on 
stewardship and regulation 
(Mills et al 2006) 
Health System 
Building blocks 
Articulation of governance as one of the six major building 





Identifying stewardship and organizational arrangements as 
one of the four levers available to policy makers to achieve 





Ensuring that governance along with the other six functions of 
a health system are driven by people to promote equity 
(WHO 2008a) 
Systems thinking for 
Health Systems 
Strengthening 
Links system thinking to health system building blocks, and 
conceptualizes governance across the building blocks 
(de Savigny and 
Adam 2009) 
Monitoring Building 
Blocks of the Health 
System 
Proposes indicators for monitoring governance and the other 




One of the most well known and provocative contributions to the health system 
discourse is the World Health Organisation’s  2000 World Health Report on ‘Health 
Systems: Improving Performance’. In this report, the health system was defined as 
“all activities whose primary purpose is to promote, restore or maintain health” and 
was presented as having four functions: stewardship; resource generation; 
financing; and service provision.  Governance is included under the concept of 
stewardship which in turn was defined as “the careful and responsible management 
of the well-being of the population”.  The objectives of the health system were 
defined as: 1) improving the health of the population they serve; 2) responding to 
people’s expectations; and 3) providing financial protection against the cost of ill 
health (WHO 2000a). The WHO 2000 health system framework was later updated 
in 2007 with the release of the WHO report ‘Everybody's Business: Strengthening 
Health Systems to Improve Health Outcomes: WHO's Framework for Action’ where 
the health system architecture was further elaborated as having six building blocks: 
leadership and governance; health workforce; information; medical products, 
vaccines and technologies; financing; and service delivery (WHO 2007). Here, 
governance was proposed as “ensuring that strategic policy frameworks exist and 
are combined with effective oversight, coalition building, regulation, attention to 
system-design and accountability”. A year later, the WHO further developed their 
conceptual framework for primary health care by placing people in the centre of the 
health system (WHO 2008a). People are vital to the functioning of a health system, 
both benefiting from it and contributing to it as tax payers and also co-producers of 
health by adopting certain lifestyle choices (Frenk 2010).  A further refinement of 
the WHO 2007 framework was proposed by de Savigny and Adam (2009) who 
highlighted the importance of incorporating a systems thinking view of the 
synergies and interactions among and across all building blocks in the health 
system (de Savigny and Adam 2009). They point out that governance operates in 
its own right in the system as well as in every other building block. This is important 
as any intervention in one building block of the health system is likely to have 
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system-wide effects which may need to be mitigated or prevented.  A systems 
thinking viewpoint requires a deeper understanding of the complex interactions 
among the various stakeholders, who may have different objectives and power 
levels, and how decisions may affect them. Beyond systems thinking in health, it is 
also important for stewards to recognise the role and impact of the health system in 
the broader socio-political environment  and that health systems are themselves 
social determinants which can influence education and employment (WHO 
Commission On The Social Determinants Of Health 2007). 
 
Thus, as the conceptualisation of health systems has evolved, so has a deepening 
of the understanding of the critical role of governance. However, approaches and 
methods to systematically assess governance in health systems remain scarce. In 
the following section, we review various studies which have focused on governance 
in health and highlight the substantial contributions which they have made towards 
our overall understanding of the importance of governance.  
 
 How has governance in health systems been Section 3.04
conceived so far? 
 
A substantial number of studies have discussed the various effects of select 
aspects of governance on the health sector (Brinkerhoff 2004;Brinkerhoff and 
Bossert 2008;Chaudhury et al 2006;Das Gupta et al 2003;Lagomarsino et al 
2009;Nishtar 2010;Ramiro et al 2001;The Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis 
and Malaria 2008;Transparency International 2006;Vian 2008;WHO 2009). 
Furthermore, some studies have empirically assessed the magnitude and impact of 
certain governance elements on health sector performance (Gupta et al 
2000;Lewis 2006;Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008). In general, most of the literature 
on governance and health has focused on single elements of governance such as 
degree of government effectiveness, degree of corruption and community 
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participation. They investigated these components using proxy indicators of health 
sector outcomes or performance such as immunization rates, percentage of low 
birth weight babies or child mortality. Although important in that they provide 
evidence of a relationship, these studies do not account for other potential 
governance elements which could affect the performance of a health system.  
 
Defining governance within the health sector is still relatively new and the 
composition of governance varies across reports, suggesting that the 
conceptualisation of governance is an ongoing process. There are, however, a few 
common elements in governance as identified in Table 3.2. 
 
The latest body of work on governance in health goes further into developing 
approaches to assess overall governance within the health system (Islam 
2007;Lewis and Pettersson 2009;Siddiqi et al. 2009;WHO 2010a). These examples 
suggest indicators which can be broadly divided into two groups: 1) determinants of 
governance; and 2) governance performance indicators (Savedoff 2009). 
Determinants of governance (or rule-based indicators as they are sometimes 
referred to (Kaufmann and Kraay 2008)) describe whether a procedure, regulation, 
policy or law exists, whilst a governance performance indicator assesses to what 
degree rules or policies have been followed and enforced. In general, it is easier to 
obtain determinants indicators than performance indicators which usually require 
surveys such as Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS), facility surveys, exit 
interviews and household interviews.  
 
 Islam (2007) approaches the assessment of governance in the health system by 
using two summary components. The first is composed of the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann et al. 2009) developed by the World Bank which rates 
a country on six governance dimensions: voice and accountability; political stability; 
governance effectiveness; rule of law; regulatory quality; and control of corruption, 
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leading to an overall governance score for a country. The second component is 
health specific and breaks governance into five dimensions: information and 
assessment capacity; policy formulation and planning; social participation and 
system responsiveness; accountability; and regulation. It proposes a set of 
illustrative questions to be answered by key stakeholders such as how information 
is used, how government coordinates donor inputs and who participates in setting 
the policy agenda?   This framework provides a comprehensive range of issues to 
explore and even provides suggestions on which stakeholders to interview. It has 
so far been applied in various countries including: Vietnam (Tran Thi Mai Oanh et 
al 2010), Kenya (Luoma et al 2010) and Angola (Connor et al 2010). Common 
areas of ‘weak’ governance found were lack of participation, transparency and 
strategic vision.  
 
Using a similar approach, WHO (2010) developed a toolkit to assess health 
systems which included a governance module where they divide the assessment of 
governance in the health system into either rules-based or outcome-based 
indicators. The rules-based indicators cover topics such as the existence of an 
essential medicines list and the existence of key health sector documents. The 
outcome-based indicators ask questions about the rate of stock-out or the 
proportion of informal payments. Both rule-based and outcome-based indicators 
are important. However a weakness of the WHO (2010) toolkit is that despite it 
being a ‘health system toolkit’, it asks questions that are limited to disease-specific 
or vertical programmes such as HIV/AIDS, reproductive health, malaria and 
tuberculosis, thus leaving out other key areas such as mental health.  Furthermore, 
asking about the ‘existence’ of such policies says little about their implementation.  
At present, we can find no example where the WHO governance monitoring 




Lewis and Pettersson (2009) developed a list of governance indicators for health 
systems grouped into five topics: budget management; human resources; 
institutional providers; informal payments; and institutions. Within each topic, 
groups of questions are proposed to investigate the topic in detail. For example, 
within human resources, questions include both governance determinants such as 
the existence of a licensing system for health care professionals, and performance 
based such as the frequency of illegal side-payments influencing hiring decisions, 
or the fraction of contracted staff not on site during a visit. These indicators 
together with questions on the design of incentives allow the researcher to gain 
more in-depth understanding of the governance challenges for that particular topic. 
The indicators are generic enough to allow for comparisons and are a mix of those 
which can be obtained easily (such as the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment - CPIA index) and those which are more challenging such as the 
frequency of under-the-table payments. This framework too has not been applied in 

















Table 3.2: Summary of governance elements as addressed in selected 
contemporary health literature  












Accountability ● ● ● ● 
Effectiveness / efficiency   ●  
Equity   ●  
Ethics   ●  
Existence of standards    ● 
Incentives    ● 
Information/ Intelligence ● ● ● ● 
Participation /collaboration ● ● ●  
Policy/System Design ● ●   
Regulation ● ●   
Responsiveness  ● ●  
Rule of Law   ●  
Transparency   ●  
Vision / Direction   ●  
Key:  ● indicates the governance element is identified as a discrete element 
         indicates the governance element is mentioned in context of other elements 
 
Another health-system specific governance framework was developed by Siddiqi et 
al (2009). The authors adapt the UNDP good governance concept (United Nations 
Development Programme 1997) to produce a framework which encompasses ten 
health system governance principles to assess governance of the health system. 
For each principle, broad questions are proposed for both the national policy 
formulation level and at the implementation level. The analytical framework has 
been used for an assessment of health system governance in Pakistan and 
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identified several areas of weakness such as lack of accountability at the national 
level and little strategic vision in designing policies. 
 
Finally, there is also a sector-specific governance assessment toolkit (‘Good 
Governance for Medicines’) developed by WHO which focuses entirely on the 
pharmaceutical sector (WHO 2009). The principle goal of this assessment 
framework is to evaluate transparency in the sector and is accompanied by a guide 
on how to assess responses, thus reducing the possibility of subjective judgement. 
This assessment has been applied in 26 countries including: Bolivia; Cambodia; 
Jordan; Indonesia; Mongolia; and Papua New Guinea. 
 
Most of these frameworks provide ‘snapshots’ of the state of governance in health 
systems by developing both quantitative and qualitative indicators. This is 
advantageous as they can highlight areas of possible gross weakness, for 
example, whether or not a country has a recent essential medicines list, or if there 
are irregularities in the payroll for health workers, or a lack of transparency in 
resource allocation. Some of these frameworks such as WHO (2010) and Lewis 
and Pettersson (2009) also permit cross-country comparisons which are useful at 
the international level. However, despite this information being useful for donors or 
international organisations, it is questionable whether it is useful for health system 
stewards who probably already know where such governance weaknesses are in 
their health systems and instead need to better understand why, where and how to 
intervene.   
 
 
 Towards a new approach to assessing governance in Section 3.05
health systems  
 
For a governance framework to be of use to a health system steward it should: 1) 
be indicative of where governance issues are; 2) weight the individual elements 
  
44 
composing governance in order to identify major drivers for “strong” or “weak” 
governance; and 3)  provide a systematic way to assess these complexities. Our 
conceptual framework is based on the WHO (2007) model of the health system, but 
modified to adopt the systems thinking approach suggested by de Savigny and 
Adam (2009) where all the areas (or building blocks) intertwine (Figure 3.1).  
 
 
Figure 3.1:  Major interdependent health system building blocks 
Reproduced with permission from de Savigny and Adam (2009) 
 
For the purposes of extending a system-wide view of governance in the health 
system we appreciate that not all six building blocks are conceptually equivalent 
blocks. We see service delivery as a health system output and a primary interface 
for perceived quality of the health system. Conversely, the health workforce; 
information; medicines and technologies; and financing building blocks are health 
system inputs.  As governance includes overseeing the entire health system, it 
permeates all other building blocks and is driven by people and actors in the 
system. This re-orientation of the WHO (2007) building blocks informs the basis of 




In our approach (Figure 3.2), we draw the most relevant and common governance 
elements found in Table 3.2 into a non-linear, systems thinking perspective on the 
health system. These elements can influence the functionality of the health system 
and can aid stewards to understand how the health system performs.   
 
A vital element of good health system governance is the drive for long term 
strategic vision which is led by stewards using transparent information and which 
needs to be translated into appropriate policies with clear rules and correctly set 
incentives. A well designed system should increase integration and reduce 
fragmentation and duplication, and it should encourage participation of all relevant 
stakeholders, both state and non-state (such as citizen groups, pharmaceutical 
companies, insurance firms), in designing policies. As participation should include 
voices of numerous stakeholders which may not always be homogenous, health 
system stewards should strive to seek consensus. Although participation is 
encouraged, there are instances when too much participation could delay or even 
harm the delivery of health care (Savedoff 2009). It is also important for stewards to 
understand the possible informal influences which various stakeholders could be 
susceptible to and which could influence their voice.  To ensure that the rules of the 
system are adhered to, a major process element of good health system 
governance is being accountable. Accountability involves “holding public 
officials/service providers answerable for processes and outcomes and imposing 
sanctions if specified outcomes are not delivered” (Lewis and Pettersson 2009). 
More specifically, accountability requires identifying who has authority over what 
decisions and what their responsibilities include. It also includes understanding how 
transparent information on responsibilities, available resources and performance is 
transmitted and used, and what incentives and sanctions are in place which may 
distort behaviours (Savedoff 2009). If all these elements are in place they can aid in 
addressing corruption i.e.,“misuse of entrusted power for private gain” 




Although both ‘regulation’ and ‘information’ were common governance elements 
seen in Table 3.2, we did not include them as elements in their own right in our 
approach. Creating information ,we believe, is addressed in the information building 
block and since regulation includes addressing incentives, setting rules and 
enforcing them, we consider that this is covered under accountability and system 
design.   
 
 
Figure 3.2:  Assessing governance across the health system 
Note: ‘strategic vision & policy design’ and ‘participation & consensus orientation’ 
can be viewed more conventionally as governance inputs, whilst ‘addressing 




In summary, a well governed health system should have clear goals based on a 
certain degree of participation of relevant stakeholders especially those from 
disadvantaged groups or who may have less power to influence polices, and from 
which transparent policies are designed and adhered to by promoting 
accountability and reducing the risk of corruption. Although we describe ‘strategic 
vision & policy design’ and ‘participation & consensus orientation’ as inputs and the 
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others as processes, these are all interlinked within the governance building block 
and are dynamic and interchangeable. For example, improving accountability can 
be considered as an input to strengthening governance. Even an improvement in a 
single governance element would be an improvement in governance. For example, 
mitigating ways in which corruption can develop, or improving the transparency of 
budget allocation would both be considered an improvement in governance. 
However, these improvements in governance may not be sufficient to increase 
overall functioning of the health system  due to various non-governance factors 
which can influence overall health system performance (Savedoff 2009). Improved 
health system performance is a rather general term which could include various 
outcomes depending on the different interest groups within the health system. It 
could mean, for example, increased profit maximization for insurance companies, 
better effective coverage (Lozano et al. 2007) for policy developers, increased 
responsiveness to the demands and needs of the population for citizen groups, or a 
general increased level and distribution of health.   
 
 Example of an application Section 3.06
 
The starting point for the application of our approach would be to select an issue 
which impedes a health system outcome, for example limiting access and benefit 
from a public health care service. Various examples have been given above, so for 
purposes of illustration here we look at governance challenges in the health 
workforce, more specifically with regards to absenteeism. We recognise that there 
are other important governance challenges in the health workforce such as the 
migration of workers from rural to urban areas, or even at a global level  which 
have been addressed by the 2010 WHO Global Code of Practice on International 
Recruitment of Health Personnel (WHO 2010b). Absenteeism in a health system is 




The first step the applier would need to do to understand why absenteeism could 
be occurring and persisting would be to map all the relevant stakeholders involved 
in human resource decisions and responses and what their roles, authorities, 
responsibilities and power relationships are (Walt and Gilson 1994). This could be 
done by using the Policy Maker software which maps out the political dimensions of 
public policy and provides a guide for thinking about policy reform (Reich and 
Cooper 1995). It is important to include as many stakeholders as possible as 
different stakeholders may see the reasons for absenteeism and the possible 
influence on the health system differently according to multi-finality (de Savigny and 
Adam 2009). 
 
The second step after stakeholder mapping is to work with stakeholders to identify 
areas where potential problems could be occurring.  This can be done as a 
facilitated brainstorming looking, for example, at possible reasons for absenteeism 
through considering the design of the system, lines of authority to make decisions, 
the level of inclusiveness of various groups in the design stage, or transparency of 
information and how it flows to those with managerial capacity. This can then be 
represented in a table according to our approach (the third step) Table 3.3 
illustrates this with an example (health worker absenteeism). As we encourage the 
assessment of governance throughout the health system, we have included a 
column for governance as the user also needs to assess the governance of the 
governing structures (such as health boards). This table guides the user across the 
approach to ensure that the various elements of governance are considered and 
how they manifest across the health system. It thus forces the user to take into 
account areas of the health system which they may not necessarily have 
considered. For example, the irregular flow of medicines and supplies could 
discourage health workers from being present. The fourth step is a stakeholder 
assessment to examine this table and rank the most likely combination of tractable 
issues to be evaluated and identify the balance of incentives and disincentives 
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which could explain the root cause of the problem (which may vary depending on 
the context). For example, the evaluators may find that the design of the system 
has not been adapted to recent health reforms (such as decentralisation) which will 
affect the balance of power and authority and may result in increased absenteeism 
in rural areas due to lack of supervision. This process could also aid in identifying 




















































Low participation from 
health workers in 
defining salary scales 
Limited avenues for 
brining together 
community and 
health workers for 
discussion 
Information on how 
community can 
participate in human 
resource decisions is not 
clear 
 Limited channels (such as 
health boards) for 
community or health workers 








System does not allow 
for incentives to be 
provided for working in 
less attractive areas;  
Salary increases not 
based on performance 
Lack of performance 
appraisals;  
Distribution of staff 
not based on service 
population  
The design of the system 
does not require that 
data  are  regularly 
collected on staff 
attendance and 
transmitted to the district  
Under-resourced 
health facilities making 
working environments 
less attractive 
System not designed to 
include sanctions that can be 
placed on health worker by  
management unit  thereby 
reducing the ability to hold 




“Ghost” workers are 
not identified  and 
continually receive 
payments  
Inability to replace 
ghost workers  
Information on 
absenteeism is 
deliberately missing or 
altered before it is 
transmitted; no 
information on sanctions 
Absent staff may be  
taking publicly funded 
resources with them to 
sell in the private 
sector thus increasing 
incentive to be absent 
Lack of supervision to 






information on salary 
scales and overtime 
payments is not 
available to staff 
A list of staff on duty 
is not available to the 
public  
Information on staff 
attendance is not 
transferred to the 
authorities  
Knowledge on future 
stock and flow is not 
transparent which 
could reduce the 
motivation for health 
staff to be present 
Decisions made by health 
facility boards or 
management unit on hiring, 
promotions and firing are not 





Ministry of Finance is 
not held to account 
when salary or bonus 
payments are late  
Staff are not held to 
account when absent 
No one is accountable 
for ensuring that regular, 
transparent data on staff 
attendance is collected & 
turned into information 
No one is held 
accountable if 
medicines go missing 
Lack of enforcement options 
to hold absent staff 
accountable at the 
community or district level 
when staff are absent 
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The fifth  and final step is to design an evaluation of the system-level governance 
interventions that follows the systems thinking approach (de Savigny and Adam 2009)  of 
combining process, contexts, effects and economic evaluation. For example, if 
absenteeism was consequent in part due to a lack of supervision because ,following the 
decentralisation reform, clear policies on supervisory responsibilities and sanctions on 
health staff absent without leave were not established, then the governance intervention 
would be to design clear policies on responsibilities and to ensure the authority and 
resources to implement them. In this example, the direct outcome for the health system of 
having unnecessary staff absenteeism at public health facilities will be reduced services 
for patients which may result in longer waiting times and increased dissatisfaction with the 
health system. If there are limited alternatives in the public sector, patients may lose faith 
in the public system and turn to the private sector which is usually more expensive and 
generally even less regulated. This will have equity implications as the poorest segments 
of the community who may have benefited from free health care now need to purchase 
their care, or go without care at all.  Once these reasons for absenteeism of health staff 
are identified and understood, the health system can respond by developing and 
implementing interventions that try to promote incentives which make being absent less 
attractive. The outcome of this will be to reduce the problem of absenteeism which should 
have positive consequences for the health system.  
 
 Differences between approaches to assess governance in Section 3.07
health systems 
 
Assessing and understanding governance in the health system is crucial as public officials, 
donors and researchers strive to understand how to improve the performance of health 
systems.  The concept of governance in health systems has evolved from a complex and 
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often neglected issue in health policy debates to one which now features regularly in 
discussions and has motivated new research. Our approach draws heavily on prior work 
but differs in that it takes a problem-driven, system-wide approach and suggests a 
practical way to look at governance concerns through the WHO (2007) building block 
framework. It is designed to start from a certain governance issue which constrains the 
health system in performing to its optimum capacity, for example informal payments or 
unaccounted losses of essential medicines. In this way, our approach follows that of 
Savedoff (2009) who suggests that for assessment of governance in the health sector, a 
particular unit of analysis must be identified to focus the attention on relationships and 
issues which matter (Savedoff 2009). However, it differs in that our starting point is not 
necessarily an organisation or unit, but a problem which may involve various dimensions 
across building blocks of the system and therefore requires a broader assessment 
approach. Our approach guides the evaluator to assess comprehensively the various 
elements of the governance failure across the system. Like Siddiqi et al (2009) we also 
recommend that governance is assessed at different levels of the system such as the 
community, health facility, district, through to the national policy level and beyond (Siddiqi 
et al 2009), even considering the influence of other organisations such as unions, 
insurance companies and international partners who may profoundly affect the 
relationships and rules of the system. Depending on the initial starting point problem, the 
relevant importance of the different building blocks or governance elements may vary. For 
example, the relationships which are studied to understand the reasons for variations in 
medicine prices throughout a country will be different to those which look at whether 
recruitment is based on skills. If our approach is applied to various issues, it may illuminate 
common governance issues across various levels of the health system or common entry 
points for intervention. By promoting an outward driven assessment which includes all 
building blocks of the health system, our approach avoids reductionist thinking of only 
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looking at input-output-outcome considerations for any given problem and encourages the 
applier to see the health system as a set of continuous and synergistic relationships. We 
recognise however, that there is no panacea to solve governance issues. This is an 
approach to improve and mitigate governance weaknesses but we do not propose that it 
would eliminate all governance bottlenecks. 
 
A limitation of our approach is that as it doesn’t provide a standard list of indicators. It  also 
does not allow comparisons between different contexts due to its broad nature, but it does 
take better account of the complexity of governance and is more flexible in that it includes 
all relevant aspects compared to other approaches based on standardised indicators. Our 
approach is also limited in that it depends on being able to identify a specific weakness in 
governance. This could, however, be identified by applying one of the previous 
frameworks such as Islam 2007, Siddiqi et al. (2009), or Lewis and Petterson (2009).  
Another limitation is that it only highlights where the barriers are and not how to design 
appropriate interventions. However by providing this first piece of the puzzle, stewards 
would be more informed and thus empowered to design interventions.   
 
 Concluding remarks Section 3.08
 
In summary, based on an assessment of contemporary literature we propose this 
approach as a practical tool to facilitate the comprehensive assessment of governance in 
health systems which can be implemented by health system practitioners who are not 
necessarily specialists in governance analysis. This approach will help to identify the most 
promising entry points for system-level governance interventions and also has the 
potential to contribute towards the appropriate design of policies ,taking into consideration 
the potential impact they have on the entire health system.  This approach should also 
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assist in advancing our understanding of governance in developing and transitional 
countries where health systems are often underperforming due to lack of investment, poor 
design and weak management practices, all of which can reduce the level of health care 
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 Abstract  Section 4.01
 
Objective: Assess whether reform in the Tanzanian medicines delivery system from a 
central “push” kit system to a decentralised “pull” Integrated Logistics System (ILS) has 
improved medicines accountability. Methods:  Rufiji District in Tanzania was used as a 
case-study. Data on medicines ordered and patients seen were compiled from routine 
information at six public health facilities in 1999 under the kit system and in 2009 under the 
ILS. Three medicines were included for comparison: an antimalarial, anthelmintic and oral 
rehydration salts (ORS).  Results: The quality of the 2009 data was hampered by 
incorrect quantification calculations for orders, especially for antimalarials. Between the 
periods 1999 and 2009 the percent of unaccounted antimalarials fell from 60% to 18%, 
while the percent of unaccounted anthelmintic medicines went from 82% to 71%. 
Accounting for ORS, on the other hand, did not improve as the unaccounted amounts 
increased from 64% to 81% during the same period. Conclusions: The ILS has not 
adequately addressed accountability concerns seen under the kit system due to a 
combination of governance and system-design challenges. These quantification 
weaknesses are likely to have contributed to the frequent periods of antimalarial stock-out 
experienced in Tanzania since 2009. We propose regular reconciliation between the 
health information system and the medicines delivery system thereby improving visibility 




 Introduction Section 4.02
 
The effective delivery of medicines requires integration and coordination of the entire 
health system. Policies are needed that shape the supply systems and its processes, 
financial systems are needed to purchase medicines,  trained human resources are 
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needed for procurement and delivery, health information systems are needed to identify 
which diseases are prevalent (and therefore the extent of need) and finally, governance is 
necessary at all levels to provide oversight and ensure overall availability and 
accountability of resources in the system. Medicines play an integral role in the 
performance of the health system (Roberts and Reich 2011;Ruxin et al. 2005); therefore, 
losses of essential medicines are not only a public health issue, but are an overall 
indicator of the ability of the health system to deliver adequate and quality health care. 
Deficits of medicines represent a direct loss of resources, particularly concerning in low 
income countries like Tanzania where medicines along with medical supplies, constitute 
the largest discretionary spending in health and account for approximately 10% of total 
health expenditure (Euro Health Group 2009). 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate how the medicines delivery system has changed 
in Tanzania over the past decade moving from a “push” to a “pull” system. Our focus was 
to track the accountability of both systems by following tracer medicines to establish 
whether the governance of the medicines delivery system has been strengthened as a 
result of this transition.  
 
 
Essential Drug Program Kit (“push” system) 1983 - 2008 
Despite the various waves of decentralisation experienced in Tanzania during the early 
1990’s, medicines and other supplies were still centrally provided (“push”) as standard, 
pre-packed Essential Drug Program (EDP) “kits” to all health facilities (excluding hospitals) 
from the Medical Stores Department (MSD). The MSD is the national semi-autonomous, 
non-profit department under the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW), 
responsible for the procurement and delivery of medicines to public and Non-
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Governmental Organization health facilities. Kits and the MSD were established with help 
from the Danish International Development Agency, Danida, together with UNICEF and 
the Government of Tanzania. Kits were coloured either blue or yellow depending on the 
level of health facility (dispensary or health centre respectively) and delivered six times a 
year (two kits per delivery) (Amenyah et al 2005). Each kit was designed to last a month 
and as they were procured pre-packed from both international and national suppliers (Euro 
Health Group 2007a), the MSD only had to manage up to four variants (Center for 
Pharmaceutical Management 2003).  The kits contained 35 medicines, 17 medical supply 
items and five stationary items (United Republic of Tanzania 1998). Medicines were 
selected based on a combination of the National Essential Drug List of Tanzania (NEDLIT) 
(first created in 1991, and updated in 2006) together with national morbidity data. The 
MSD delivered kits to the district capital which had two weeks to distribute the kits to 
health facilities ensuring their arrival on the first day of the month (Euro Health Group 
2007a). A study in 1998 found that nearly all (99%) of kits distributed arrived at their 
destination, suggesting few were being lost during delivery (Price Waterhouse Coopers 
Tanzania 1999). Nevertheless, the standardized nature of the kits meant that in some 
areas certain medicines were depleted at a faster rate, causing stock-outs or accumulated 
surpluses due to differences in catchments areas and disease burdens (Amenyah et al 
2005;Center for Pharmaceutical Management 2003;COWI et al 2007). To mitigate stock-
outs and expired medicines, the District Medical Officer (DMO) was authorized to re-
allocate medicines between facilities; however, due to lack of funds for transport and 
significant political pressure by communities not to move medicines away from their local 
facilities, re-distribution of medicines seldom occurred (Gilson et al. 1994).  
 
Indent/Integrated Logistics System (“pull” system) 2004 -present 
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In early 2000 with support from DANIDA, the Pharmaceutical Supply Section (PSS) within 
the MoHSW designed a new “pull” system (indent) which included 70 essential medicines 
and allowed health facilities (excluding hospitals) to specifically order individual medicines. 
Vertical programs such as family planning and specific disease control programs including 
sexually transmitted infections, malaria and HIV remained independent and developed 
their own individual supply chains.  Under the indent system, facilities had individual 
accounts at MSD and received a standard credit roughly equivalent to three monthly kits 
worth every quarter (Boex and Msemo 2007). Health facilities were required to estimate 
quarterly consumption (current ‘stock on hand’ subtracted from quarterly monthly 
consumption) for the 70 items and place quarterly medicines orders through the district 
office. The DMO was responsible for examining the orders against the available fund 
credit and then distributing the packages upon receipt from MSD. The indent system 
meant that MSD moved away from supplying four stock items, to individually packing 70 
products in the orders for over 3000 health facilities every month (Center for 
Pharmaceutical Management 2003). As with the kit system, health facilities were almost 
entirely dependent on the MSD for medicine supplies; a study carried out in 2005/2006 
found little difference in medicines availability between the two systems (Euro Health 
Group 2007a).  
 
 In 2005, the MoHSW in collaboration with John Snow Inc’s DELIVER Project  expanded 
the indent “pull” system to include all vertical programs under the umbrella of the 
Integrated Logistics management System (ILS) and rolled it out nationally in 2009. The 
Expanded Program of Immunization and the National Tuberculosis and Leprosy Programs 
were excluded however, as they were deemed to perform well under their own vertical 
programs (Amenyah et al 2005). The ILS introduced a new ordering system of 12 forms to 
be completed by health facilities.  The Request and Report (R&R) form (Figure 4.1) is 
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used for quarterly ordering of around 100 pre-determined priority medicines (all items in 
the kit were included in this list). The R&R form contains a fixed algorithm which requires 
data from stock ledgers together with physical counts of inventory to estimate presumed 




Figure 4.1: Ordering formula used in ILS Request & Report forms, Tanzania 
Source: Amenyah, J. et al 2005 
 
From the R&R form, the quantity needed (F) is estimated  using the quarterly consumption 
(E) divided by three to attain the monthly consumption which is multiplied by seven and 
from which any stock on hand (D) is deducted. Health facilities order for seven months in 
advance: for the three months in a quarter, two months for the MSD and District 
processing time and the remaining months as a buffer stock to account for increases in 
consumption due to seasonal patterns and any delays in ordering (Amenyah et al 2005). 
The quantity requested is based on quantity needed (F) and the MSD sale catalogue 
which contains information on pack sizes. The ILS therefore increased both the number of 
medicines ordered and the complexity of the ordering formula. 
 
Completed R&R forms are submitted to the district for review by both the District 
Pharmacist and the DMO before being sent to the MSD. Copies of the R&R form are kept 
at the health facility, the office of the DMO and the MSD. At the district level, health 
facilities  are divided into three ordering groups submitting R&R forms for the quarter in 
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Funds for the purchase of medicines represent a combination of the district block grant 
(from government) and a “basket fund” (from donors). The PSS is responsible for 
providing oversight on medicines policy and assisting health facilities to order medicines 
using the ILS. Allocation of funds for medicines purchase is based on service population. 
Based on the recommendations of PSS, funds are released quarterly by the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA) to health facility accounts in the MSD via the 
MoHSW.  Funding for medicines is based on a revolving fund, where once health facilities 
place orders with the MSD, the funds are released from the individual accounts and 
transferred to the MSD working capital which can be used for future procurement. The 
MSD finances its operating costs by charging a 17.4% mark-up on all medicines and 
supplies, except for vertical programs where the overhead is lower at 14% (Euro Health 
Group 2007b). Health facilities therefore rely almost entirely on delivery from the MSD 
which, in turn, is reliant on the timely and complete allocation of funds from the MoHSW, 
which relies on the release of funds from the MoFEA. 
 
MTUHA/Health Management and Information System 
At the national level, the forecasts of the demand for selected medicines is based on data 
collected by the health information system (HIS or MTUHA as known in Tanzania). The 
current MTUHA developed in the early 1990’s (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
Tanzania 2010a) requires health facilities to manually record data in 12 booklets which 
contain forms and registers. This information is summarised quarterly and submitted to the 
office of the DMO for review before being computerised and made accessible at the 
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Regional level. As the MTUHA system was deemed inadequate for some large 
programmes, a number of parallel, vertical information systems for specific diseases such 
as HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Leprosy have subsequently been developed (Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare Tanzania 2007a) . 
 
Tanzania therefore has two sources of information for monitoring medicines accountability, 
on the demand side they have the health information system (MTUHA), while data on the 
supply of medicines come from the ILS at present, and previously from the EDP kits. 
We reconcile these two sources of information from both medicines delivery systems to 
determine whether the accountability of medicines delivery has improved under the ILS. 
 Methods Section 4.03
 
“Push” - 1999 
Our case-study is based in the Rufiji District in South East Tanzania, one of the 132 
districts of Tanzania. The Rufiji District is representative of a rural coastal district in 
Tanzania and the district selected by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare for the 
coastal sentinel demographic surveillance system. In 1999, the Rufiji District, as in the rest 
of the country, was receiving medicines through the “push” kit system. At the same time, 
Rufiji was one of two pilot districts (along with Morogoro District), selected for the 
‘Tanzania Essential Health Interventions Project’ (TEHIP) (de Savigny et al. 2008) which 
sought to apply the principles and methods of the 1993 World Development Report (WDR) 
on evidence-based planning to guide strategic investments in health based on burden of 
disease and cost-effectiveness analyses. We went to health facilities to collect individual 
patient data from ledger books on patient attendances, diagnoses as well as 
corresponding medicines dispensed at the health facility level. The data collected from 
facility ledger books were also compared to summary statistics compiled at the facility 
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under the MTUHA. Data on medicines stock levels were taken from health facilities as the 
sum of the opening balance inventory carried over to 1999 from the previous year plus the 
total amount of medicines received in the kits (including any other additional medicines 
received) minus stock on hand at the end of the year compensating for any expired 
medicines removed from inventory during the year.  From this, the amount of medicines 
specifically dispensed was compared to identify the fraction of unaccounted medicines 
(any consumed medicines which could not be accounted for in patient registers).  For 
1999 this was conducted in six of the 53 public health facilities in Rufiji using a total of 11 
“tracer” medicines: mebendazole; metronidazole; ferrous sulphate; penicillin V; 
magnesium trisilicate; chloroquine; doxycyline; tetracyclin ointment; aminophylline and oral 
rehydration salts (ORS). 
 
“Pull” - 2009 
In 2009 we replicated the analysis for unaccounted medicines in the same six health 
facilities  to determine whether the amount of unaccounted medicines had changed 
following Rufiji’s move, like the rest of the country, to ILS with training completed in 2009. 
We used data available at the district level from both the ILS and the MTUHA. As a proxy 
for medicines dispensed, we used the estimated consumption recorded in the ILS orders.  
We verified the reported estimated consumption figure by re-doing the arithmetic using the 
data provided (as part of Figure 4.1). As we were unable to obtain information about 
medicines dispensed, we restricted the sample medicines to those which were uniquely 
prescribed for a single disease therefore assuming that the medicines would only be used 
for treatment of a single disease: artemisinin combination therapies (ACT) as the first line 
treatment for malaria; albendazole (current anthelmintic) for the treatment of all protoza 




From MTUHA we obtained annual summaries of out-patient data collected at the health 
facility for malaria, worms and diarrhoea. 
 
 Results Section 4.04
 
Reconciliation of medicines supply under the “Push” system, 1999 
The 1999 results illustrate that the summary health information reported under the MTUHA 
was accurate, with less than 1% difference in total out-patient numbers compared to the 
information collected from the patient ledgers. Figure 4.2 illustrates that there were 
important disparities between recorded amounts of medicines dispensed and out-patients 
recorded for all 11 medicines investigated. We could not account for over 50% of 
medicines received in 1999  this was most evident in the case of mebendazole where 
almost the entire stock (83%) was unaccounted for.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Reconciliation of medicines received vs. medicines dispensed, Rufiji, 
1999. Sample of two health centres and five dispensaries  











































































































































Reconciliation of medicines supply under the “Pull” system, 2009 
Data gaps existed in the completion of R&R forms where not one of the six health facilities 
submitted all four forms in 2009. As a consequence of data gaps we combined quarterly 
estimated consumption from 2009 and 2010 (Table 4.1) to estimate a yearly average.  
Data gaps resulted in a slight seasonal bias towards dry season orders (Q2 and Q4) – 10, 
compared to 9 quarters of rainy season (Q1 and Q3) - however the impact would be 
minimised as dry season orders immediately follow a rainy season. 
 
Table 4.1: Quarterly R&R forms submitted across six health facilities, Rufiji, 2009 
and 2010 
 2009 2010 
Health 
Facility 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
1                 
2                
3                 
4                 
5                 
6                 
 
The second challenge was miscalculation by the health worker of ‘estimated consumption’ 
due to arithmetic errors. These errors in estimated consumption arise from a number of 
miscalculations including the addition of extra zeros, adding the closing balance instead of 
subtracting it, or counting medicines that had not been recorded as received (this was 





Combining the estimated consumption together with information from the health 
information system, we were able to estimate the amount of unaccounted medicines and 
then to compare it with the values from 1999 for the same three classes of medicines 
(Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2: Percentage of unaccounted medicines (anthelmintic, antimalarial, ORS) in 
1999 and 2009 across six public health facilities in the Rufiji District, Tanzania 
 Medicine 
1999 
 (95% CI) 
2009 
 (95% CI) 
Antimalarial 59.8% (59.7-60.0) 17.8% (17.5 – 18.2) 
ORS 63.8% (63.1-64.5) 80.7% (80.1 – 81.3) 
Anthelmintic 81.9% (81.6 - 82.1) 71.1% (70.2 -72.0) 
 
Antimalarial: The amount of unaccounted antimalarials was reduced from 60% in 1999 to 
18% ten years later.  The results are statistically significant at the 95% level. 
 
ORS: The accountability of ORS appears to have deteriorated over the past ten years 
from 64% unaccounted ORS in 1999 to 81% unaccounted ORS in 2009. The results are 
statistically significant at the 95% level.   
 
Anthelmintic: The amount of unaccounted anthelmintic was reduced from 82% in 1999 to 
71% ten years later.  This too, is statistically significant at the 95% level.   
 
 Discussion Section 4.05
 
As medicines budgets typically constitute a large proportion of discretionary health 
spending, countries must ensure that the appropriate quantities of medicines arrive at 
health facilities on time, and once there, are dispensed according to medicines distribution 
67 
 
and treatment policies. The current ILS was introduced to provide “routine reporting of 
data coupled with routine ordering of resupplies, which enhances accountability and 
provides the central level with data for decision making” (Amenyah et al 2005) and indeed, 
has the potential to do so. However, from the evidence presented here, not one of the 
surveyed health facilities studied routinely reported as part of the ILS and there was no 
uniform improvement in accountability for the three selected “tracer” medicines. Although 
accountability of anthelmintic and antimalarial medicines appears to have improved, the 
fact remains that still 71% and 18% are unaccounted respectively, whilst the accountability 
for ORS appears to have deteriorated. Although reaching a level of 0% of unaccounted 
medicines would be ideal, counting and arithmetic errors are realistically likely to occur in 
administrative data. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, we set a level of 85% 
accounted medicines as acceptable. This level reflects the general uncertainty, inaccuracy 
and incompleteness of information available from routine reporting systems, it is a 
generous margin of error, and not intended as a gold standard.  The ILS did not reach this 
level and is therefore in need of a management response.  
 
 
Considering that the MSD price of a tin of 100 tablets of albendazole is currently TZS 
1,600 (US$ 1.00), TZS 11,000 (US$ 7.09) for 100 ORS sachets (MSD price catalogue 
2011) and the government recommended retail price of a subsidised dose of ACT is TZS 
1,000 (US$0.60) (Yadav et al. 2012), then the yearly value of the unaccounted medicines 
in 2009 was US$ 3,630 for the six health facilities. Projected to the Rufiji District level, the 
annual value of unaccounted medicines would be around US$ 31,500. 
 
Due to the use of secondary data which in some instances was incomplete, our study is 
subject to bias.  For example, the six health facilities were not randomly selected but 
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selected on the basis of accessibility to facilitate data collection. The implication of this 
could be that the health facilities were more likely to have a larger flow of medicines but 
also more frequented by patients, therefore the bias could move in both directions.   We 
also assume that each of the three “tracer” medicines is used for a single disease, yet this 
may not always be the case.  
A possible limitation of our study design is that our methods rely on different data sources 
for the amount of consumed medicines; where in 1999 this came directly from medicines 
dispensed, whilst in 2009 this was derived from estimated consumption. Although demand 
driven (number of patients) information was collected the same way in both periods (using 
summary HMIS records), we were only able to verify the accuracy of the 1999 data. The 
health information data may have deteriorated over the years as health workers become 
increasingly burdened with the rise in the number of vertical programs and may not see 
the purpose of accurately reporting data. Therefore, a likely contribution to the 
unaccountability of “tracer” medicines may be that not all patients seen were recorded.  
 
Poor record keeping and late submission of ordering forms by health facility workers has 
been found by others (Chimnani et al. 2010;Euro Health Group 2007a;GIZ and Tanzanian 
German Programme to Support Health TGPSH 2011a).  The lack of capacity of health 
facility staff to correctly order and manage medicines was also reported in a GIZ-funded 
project assessing 87 health facilities in four Regions in 2011 (GIZ and Tanzanian German 
Programme to Support Health TGPSH 2011a). In addition, the GIZ report found that in 
some cases during redistribution of medicines by the District Pharmacists, medicines 
ledger books were not adjusted. The risk of mistakes in ordering at the health facility level 
is accentuated in the case of ACT due to the four separate doses (based on patient 
weight) and because of the seasonality of malaria.  Ordering mistakes could have 
contributed in part to the frequent periods of ACT stock-out which Tanzania has 
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experienced since 2009 together with other factors such as delayed procurement and 
distribution by the MSD due to lack of funds or capacity. 
 
On the demand side, another limitation could be the changes in clinical treatment 
guidelines where for example, in the past albendazole was more readily dispensed, or 
changes in patient demands may have resulted in patients receiving a dose of ACT, ORS 
or albenzaole even if they came into the health facility for another purpose.   
 
A contributing factor to some of the “tracer” medicines not being fully accounted for could 
be leakage along the medicines supply chain, perhaps, involving direct pilferage. 
Incidences of theft of medicines at the health facility level in Tanzania have frequently 
been reported in the press (Siyame 2012a;The Citizen 2011); for example, the Daily News 
recently described the arrest of several pharmacists from a pharmacy owned by 
employees of the regional hospital  who were discovered selling medicines intended for 
the public sector, especially malarial medicines (Siyame 2012b). The Audit Report on 
Global Fund grants to Tanzania in 2009, reported a comparison between number of 
malaria cases and estimated ACT consumed which found nearly twice the amount of ACT 
consumed for the number of malaria patients, suggesting a “leakage” in the ACT 
medicines delivery (The Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria 2009b).  
ACTs also have a much higher re-sale value than previous antimalarials (chloroquine) and 
the street value of ACT would have increased during periods of national public sector 
stock-outs which may increase the incentive for pilferage. Such leakages have also been 
found in other countries; a study by McPake and colleagues (McPake et al. 1999) in 
Uganda using similar methods to ours together with qualitative evidence, found very high 





Our results are inconclusive whether the ILS is better or worse, but emphasize the point 
that both systems clearly reveal an unacceptable accountability gap  Two general 
obstacles could explain this, the first is complexity in the design of the logistics system, the 
second being its governance. Design weaknesses in the ILS include an increased work 
burden on staff by requiring them to make many difficult calculations for over 100 products 
every three months and submit  forms in person to the district capital. Going to the district 
capital could mean over a day’s travel for those working in some remote locations which 
would leave these health facilities without staff during the travel period. Limitations of 
health worker capacity were also found during an evaluation of the ILS pilot in Dodoma 
and Iringa regions in 2005 where health workers were failing to fill in requests for all 
priority medicines and to submit the R&R forms on time (Amenyah et al 2005). These 
problems could be mitigated through increased training of staff and if the ordering was 
done using mobile phones or digital devices and the ordering system was simplified, for 
example, with calculations of estimated consumption being done only once a year and 
quarterly deliveries from the MSD being based on these estimates.   
 
The ILS was designed to integrate the vertical programs with the essential medicines 
program but certain vertical programs such as TB, AIDs and vaccines still operate 
separately. These items are delivered through their respective vertical programs, with 
additional reporting systems which have the potential to create further confusion and 
workload for health workers.  Integrating these programmes into the ILS would avoid 
parallel systems and reduce the burden on health workers to report separately. Design 
failures of supply chains in low income countries have been identified as one of the most 




Regarding governance, the ILS appears to have limited accountability structures. For 
instance, no individual (health facility worker or district health official) is held accountable if 
an ILS form is not submitted or if repeated mistakes in calculations are being submitted to 
the MSD, gaps in the data hamper efforts towards improving accountability.  If no order is 
placed, then no medicines arrive with the ultimate consequence that the community goes 
without medicines. Lack of district oversight was also found in the 2010 evaluation by 
Chimnani et al. (Chimnani et al 2010). Our study also found cases where the district re-
submitted old forms with new dates. Achieving accountability requires a degree of 
transparency, although the ILS is designed to increase transparency, if health workers do 
not complete forms adequately, then the ILS  cannot provide information on medicines 
distribution  once at the facility level. Data reconciliation with the health information system 
(MTUHA) as done in this study, would be a simple way to check the plausibility of 
medicines ordered.. Introducing systematic data reconciliation between the ILS and the 
MTUHA would greatly improve information on rational medicines consumption. Without the 
ability of the ILS to fully account for medicines ordered, delivered, prescribed and used, 
the system will continue to suffer from inherent inconsistencies combined with increasing 
vulnerability and negligence. In the case of essential life saving medicines such as ACT, 
the need for accountability is increased to ensure avoidable mortality is reduced. 
 
At present Tanzania is investing significant resources towards a mHealth strategy which 
will strengthen some of the limitations of the  ILS under the ‘ILS Gateway’ model, a USAID 
funded project. The ILS Gateway is a mobile phone-based alert and reporting system for 
the supply and logistics of 20 essential health commodities and is being piloted across 
1,600 public health facilities.  The mHealth rollout will also include other disease 
monitoring initiatives using mobile phones. Together, these initiatives should make 
reconciliation of data easier and highlight inconsistencies. Another recent change is that 
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the MSD will deliver directly to health facilities (bypassing the DMO), making the MSD fully 
accountable for the entire supply chain.  This, in combination with the mHealth strategy is 
encouraging considering the increasing number of new initiatives (medicines donations 
and low cost access initiatives)  together with an expected rise in the number of health 
facilities (7,000 by mid 2013), both of which may augment the workload and complexity at 
the MSD increasing the need for a reliable reporting system. 
 
 
 Conclusion Section 4.06
 
The availability of medicines at health facilities is a critical element of service delivery 
quality, without which the districts will be seriously limited in their ability to provide 
adequate health care. To our knowledge, this study is the first to critically examine the 
availability of medicines under the current logistics supply system compared to the 
previous kit system. This study suggests that there is an opportunity to reconcile 
information on the demand for essential medicines with their supply. This approach could 
be a way of exploring the accountability of resources in a health system, which was not 
exploited under either medicines delivery system. Of the three medicines we compared, 
absolute accountability rates were still low in the ILS with around 20% to 80% of medicines 
not being accounted for, and with one tracer (ORS) experiencing a deterioration in 
accountability compared to the previous kit system. Such degrees of unaccountability in 
the distribution of medicines suggest that the ILS is unable to effectively monitor the 
supply and use of medicines, thus facilitating a health system environment in which 
obfuscation can occur and in which performance can go unrewarded.  Although the ILS 
was designed to increase accountability and to reduce wastage of resources, its overly 
complex and “paper-driven” design together with other factors such as limited regular staff 
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training and supervision has constrained it from fully achieving these targets. As essential 
medicines constitute a key component of service delivery quality, which in turn is critical 
for improving effective access, urgent system design and governance interventions need 
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 Abstract Section 5.01
 
Background 
Between 2007 and 2013 the Tanzanian public sector received 93.1 million doses of first-
line anti-malarial artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) in the form of artemether-
lumefantrine entirely supplied by funding partners. The introduction of a health facility ACT 
stock monitoring system using SMS technology by the National Malaria Control 
Programme in mid 2011, revealed a high frequency of stock-outs of ACT in primary care 
public health facilities. The objective of this study is to determine the pattern of availability 
of ACT and possible causes for observed stock-outs across public health facilities in 
Tanzania since mid-2011.  
Methods 
 Data was collected weekly  by the mobile phone reporting tool SMS for Life on ACT 
availability from over 5,000 public health facilities in Tanzania starting from September 
2011 to December 2012. Stock data for all four age-dose levels of ACT across health 
facilities was summarised and supply of ACT at the national level was also documented.   
Results 
Over the period of 15 months, on average 29% of the total health facilities in Tanzania 
were completely stocked out of all four-age dose levels of the first-line anti-malarial with a 
median duration of total stock-out period of six weeks. Patterns of total stock-out by region 
ranged from a low of 9 to a high of 52%.   The ACT stock-outs were most likely caused by: 
a) insufficient ACT treatments entering Tanzania (e.g. in 2012 Tanzania received 10.9 
million ACT doses compared with a forecast demand of 14.4 million doses); and b) 






The reduced ACT availability and irregular pattern of supply were due to cumbersome 
bureaucratic processes and delays both within the country and  the main donor, the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Tanzania should invest in strengthening 
both the supply system and the health information system using mHealth solutions such 
as SMS for Life. This will continue to assist in tracking ACT availability across the country 
where all partners work towards more streamlined, demand driven and accountable 
procurement and supply chain systems.  
 
 Background Section 5.02
 
Malaria is of leading public health concern in Tanzania, especially for children under the 
age of five and pregnant women. According to the latest Tanzania HIV/AIDS and Malaria 
Indicator Survey in 2011-12, the prevalence of malaria rapid diagnostic test (mRDT) -
confirmed malaria in children under five was 9% (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) et al. 
2012). This is an important reduction compared to findings from the previous five years  in 
the 2007-08 Malaria Indicator Survey, when 18% of children under five tested positively for 
malaria (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) et al. 2008). Expenditure on malaria 
interventions (including prevention and curative) accounts for 19.4% of total health 
expenditure and 1.6% of Gross Domestic Product in Tanzania (Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare Tanzania 2010b), although the domestic budget for malaria activities has 
decreased by around 30% since 2005 (The Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and 
Malaria 2009a). The disease places a large burden on the country’s health sector, 
accounting for around 40% of outpatient department diagnoses  in 2008 (Ministry of Health 




At the end of 2006, Tanzania changed its policy on first-line anti-malarial treatment for 
uncomplicated malaria to use of artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) - 
artemether-lumefantrine (ALu) (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) et al 2008); due to the 
high cost of ACT, Tanzania received USD 75 million from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (henceforth referred to as the Global Fund) during its Round 4 
disbursements in 2005 (continuing currently through Round 9) to purchase ACT for use in 
the public sector. In rural Tanzania, for fever it has been shown that 58% of the population 
access their health services from public health facilities and the remaining 42% access 
from the private sector including faith-based organizations (Mikkelsen-Lopez et al. 2013).   
 
Tanzania’s Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW), through its National Malaria 
Control Programme (NMCP), is responsible for forecasting ACT demand and managing 
Global Fund grants and President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) ACT supplies for the malaria 
programme (President's Malaria Initiative 2012). The Pharmaceutical Services Section 
(PSS) is tasked with developing policy on pharmaceutical services and technologies. The 
Medical Stores Department (MSD), a parastatal of the MoHSW, is charged with handling 
health commodities for the public sector, including ACT procurement, storage and 
distribution (Boex and Msemo 2007). Public health facilities order ACT quarterly along with 
other medicines through a “pull” system via the Integrated Logistic System (ILS) (Amenyah 
et al 2005). ACT are provided to the public from government health facilities and, 
according to policy, are dispensed free to children under the age of five years and to 
adults over 60 years (Mubyazi 2004).  Others pay a user fee in the public sector of TZS 
1000 (USD 0.70) (fee since 2007) (Mushi 2007). As stated in the 2005 Integrated 
Management of Childhood Illnesses Guidelines, ACT are given as a presumptive 
treatment in the absence of diagnostic tests, when a child reports with fever without other 
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symptoms, such as rapid breathing or other respiratory symptoms, which could indicate 
pneumonia or a common cold (WHO and UNICEF 2005).  However recognising that 
presumptive treatment may result in over prescribing of ACT, mRDTs were rolled out in 
Tanzania in early 2009 with national coverage by early 2012 for routine use in all levels of 
care for parasitological confirmation of malaria (Masanja et al. 2012). Apart from ACT, 
other anti-malarials offered include sulphadoxine–pyrimethamine (SP), which is 
recommended only as intermittent preventive treatment during pregnancy, and quinine 
which is a second-line treatment for cases contra-indicated for ACT, administered to 
pregnant women in their first trimester, or in cases of severe malaria, not responding to 
first-line treatment (National Malaria Control Programme 2006).  
 
The design of the ACT procurement and delivery system is intended to guarantee routine 
availability in the public sector. Nonetheless, Tanzania, along with its neighbours, has 
been experiencing public sector ACT stock-outs over the past five years (GIZ and 
Tanzanian German Programme to Support Health TGPSH 2011b;Kangwana et al 
2009a;President's Malaria Initiative 2012;Sudoi et al. 2012;The Global Fund to Fight AIDS 
Tuberculosis and Malaria 2009b;The PLoS Medicine Editors 2009;Zurovac et al. 
2007b;Zurovac et al 2008) with serious consequences for health care delivery and also to 
household health expenditure as seen in the Ulanga District in Tanzania (Mikkelsen-Lopez 
et al 2013). The objective of this study is to describe ACT availability across public health 
facilities in Tanzania and highlight some of the factors that influence it.  
 
 Methods Section 5.03
 
Data on the availability of ACT were obtained from the SMS for Life reporting system 
(Barrington et al. 2010b), which was originally developed by the partnership of the NMCP, 
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Roll Back Malaria, Novartis Pharma AG, Vodafone, IBM, Medicines for Malaria Venture, 
and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and which is now fully owned 
and operated by the MoHSW with support from the Global Fund. The SMS for Life system 
monitors weekly ACT stock levels via a mobile phone Short Message Service (SMS) for all 
four age-specific dose levels of ACT plus quinine. The ACT doses are divided into 
individual colour-coded blister packets according to weight of the patient: yellow packs for 
infants weighing 5 kg to under 15 kg; blue packs for toddlers weighing 15 kg to under 25 
kg; red packs for children weighing 25 kg to under 35 kg; and, green packs for children 
weighing more than 35 kg and adults. Weekly SMS prompts are sent to designated 
primary care facility health workers in each health facility on their personal phones. Facility 
health workers are then required to report back within 27 hours on the stock count of full 
boxes of ACT in the store room for each of the four types. These messages are free of 
charge and if the health worker reports within 27 hours, they receive a credit on their 
phone (TZS 1,000, equivalent to USD 0.7) for personal use (pay for performance). Weekly 
summary and detailed status reports of stock situations in each facility are subsequently 
provided automatically to the District Medical Officer (DMO) and District Pharmacist. This 
aids to determine and indicate which health facilities are at risk of stocking out, or actually 
stocked out of any dose level of ACT. The data are also made available on a password-
protected website which displays current and historical stock status by health facility in a 
user-friendly, dashboard-driven application. Information is provided both graphically in 
trend format and on weekly-updated, interactive maps for greater interpretability. The 
website is available to the DMOs, the Regional Medical Officers, the NMCP, the MSD and 
the MoHSW-PSS and others stakeholders including Population Services International 
(PSI), Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) and the Swiss Agency for Development  and 
Cooperation (SDC). The SMS for Life system began as a 21-week pilot in October 2009 
covering 129 health facilities in three rural districts: Kigoma Rural (Kigoma Region), Lindi 
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Rural (Lindi Region) and Ulanga (Morogoro Region). It was rolled out nationally two years 
later across all 132 districts, eventually covering 5,014 public health facilities by 
September 2011.  
 
Data was collected from SMS for Life for 15 months from October 2011 to December 2012 
inclusive for this study. The data, comprising the weekly numbers of boxes in stock, by 
colour-code, for each facility were downloaded in delimited ASCII format and tabulated 
using SAS v9.3 statistical software.  A small number of facilities reported stocks that were 
multiples of thirty of plausible numbers of boxes.  It was assumed these reports referred to 
numbers of blister-packs rather than of boxes, and divided accordingly.  
 
Weeks where stock increased (compared with the preceding report) were assumed to 
correspond to deliveries, and a stock-out was identified when the facility reported that they 
had no stock for one or more colours of blister packs. The study concentrated on total ACT 
stock-out when all four colours of blister-packs are simultaneously stocked out, since 
health workers could otherwise cope with a stock-out of only one or a few dose levels by 
dividing or combining blister packets of other dose levels. Stock-out data by health facility 





Figure 5.1 Percentage of health facilities reporting total artemisinin combination 
therapy stock-out, by health facility type (Public and Voluntary), Tanzania, October 
2011 to  December 2012 
 
The 55,047 weeks when a stock-out was reported fell into 11,423 sequences of 
continuous reporting of stock-out in the same facility. 5,936 of these periods ended with an 
ACT delivery and the remaining terminated with a censoring event, (either a week where 
the report was missing or the end of the study).  Kaplan-Meier analysis was used to 
estimate the distribution of durations of periods of stock-out allowing for these censoring 
events.   
 
The drug usage rate in facilities that were not stocked-out was estimated as the average 
rate of decrease in stocks when there was no delivery.  This estimated drug usage was 
added to the reported increase in stocks during weeks when there was a delivery to give 
an estimate of the total amount of drug delivered. This study also documented the 
quantities of ACT shipped and delivered to Tanzania by Novartis Pharma Ag, (which at the 






































Not all health facilities reported every week in both 2011 and 2012. Table 5.1 illustrates 
the percentage of health facilities which failed to provide any report by region for both 
years. For the complete year of 2012, 11% of health facilities failed to report across the 
country and 8.6% of health facilities failed to report at all during the entire study period. 
Wide variations in the regional reporting performance were identified from approximately 
30% of health facilities in Singida and Dodoma regions failing to report at all, whilst only 
0.5% of health facilities in Iringa and Shinyanga regions provided no reporting.  
 
 
Table 5.1 Percentage of health facilities never reporting under SMS for Life by 





Singida 29.6 29.1 
Dodoma 29.5 29.8 
Morogoro 21.7 21.7 
Manyara 14.0 16.0 
Arusha 13.2 12.2 
Lindi 13.1 10.8 
Katavi 11.5 13.5 
Mbeya 11.1 12.0 
Kigoma 11.0 10.5 
Ruvuma 10.1 7.6 
Kilimanjaro 9.9 16.0 
Dar 9.7 13.7 
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Tanga 8.9 9.3 
Coast 8.1 7.0 
Rukwa 8.0 8.0 
Mwanza 6.7 8.5 
Mtwara 6.5 9.5 
Tabora 6.4 8.2 
Simiyu 4.4 2.3 
Njombe 3.8 4.3 
Mara 3.1 4.3 
Kagera 2.8 4.0 
Geita 1.9 5.5 
Iringa 0.6 1.2 
Shinyanga 0.5 1.9 
 
 
Short-term average, non-response rate in 2011 showed that 19.8% of weekly SMS 
request prompts sent received no response, while in 2012 this had increased to 27.7%.  
However the duration of non-response in any given facility was short (average 1.8 weeks). 
In instances when there was a missing report, the information was interpreted from the 
stock data of the previous week.  
 
Stock-out data by region is derived from the number of weekly SMS received across all 
health facilities that reported zero stock as a proportion of the total number of SMS 




Table 5.2  Regional malaria prevalence and average regional artemisinin 
combination therapy total stock-out rates in health facilities in 2011-2012 
 
Mainland 
region Prevalence % total stock-out 
Tabora 9.2 52.4 
Kigoma 26 51.6 
Ruvuma 12 42.6 
Geita 31.8 42.5 
Shinyanga 6.8 42.1 
Mtwara 17.4 41.1 
Mwanza 18.6 40.3 
Rukwa 4.5 37.8 
Simiyu 3.4 36.8 
Morogoro 13 35.6 
Mara 25.4 31.7 
Katavi 5.4 29.7 
Lindi 26.3 24.7 
Tanga 5.6 24.3 
Njombe 2.4 22.5 
Dar es Salaam 3.6 22.4 
Iringa 0.4 21.9 
Arusha 0.05 19.7 
Kagera 8.3 19.2 
Pwani 10.2 18.1 
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Mbeya 0.05 15.1 
Kilimanjaro 0.05 14.8 
Manyara 0.9 14.4 
Singida 0.2 12.4 




A simple univariate linear regression analysis was used to study the relationship between 
malaria prevalence rates and ACT stock-out rates, where regional average ACT stock-
outs across the 15 months were regressed against regional malaria prevalence rates for 
2011. 
 
 Results Section 5.04
 
During the period of study, there were 3030 logins of which 620 logins were by DMOs in 
districts, 32 by Ministry system administrators and 150 by the NMCP.  
 
The proportion of health facilities that recorded simultaneous zero ACT stock of all four 
doses (total stock-out) as a proportion of all health facility weeks, averaged across the 





Figure 5.2  Percentage of health facilities with total artemisinin combination therapy 
stock-out, Tanzania, October 2011 to December 2012  
Bars show ACT dose shipments (millions) from the supplier to the public sector (either 
from PMI or AMFm or both in June 2012) 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the proportion of health facilities with ACT stock-out (line) and the bars 
indicate the ACT supply quantities (with corresponding source). For example, in May 2012 
43% of health facilities reported zero ACT stock. For the whole period from October 2011 
to December 2012, on average 29% of SMS health facility responses reported a total ACT 
stock-out.  The peak total ACT stock-out period was in the rainy season of April-May 2012, 
when total ACT stock-out rates reached 40%, implying that nearly half the country was 
totally stocked out of ACT in the public sector. The estimated median duration of stock-out 
was six weeks (inter-quartile range 2-14 weeks), with Dar es Salaam experiencing the 




Figure 5.3 compares average stock-out rates from the SMS for Life reporting system and 
malaria prevalence in children under the age of five from 2011-2012 Tanzania National 
HIV/AIDs and Malaria Indicator Survey across the 25 regions of Tanzania mainland. A 
simple linear regression  analysis suggests that higher malaria prevalence rates correlate 
positively with higher ACT stock-out rates where for every 0.8% increase in prevalence is 






Figure 5.3  Malaria prevalence (top panel) and average annual total stock-out rate of 
artemisinin combination therapy in health facilities (bottom panel) by region in 
2011-2012 in mainland Tanzania   
 
 
The study found that over 90% of ACT doses that were reported delivered from Novartis  
in 2012 were documented by SMS for Life as passing through the supply chain to the 
front- line public health facilities, however this is a conservative estimate as it is not 
adjusted for non-reporting.  
 
 Discussion Section 5.05
 
 
The ACT stock-outs in Tanzania mainland have not been well documented in the 
literature.  By the mHealth innovation of SMS for Life producing real-time weekly stock 
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reporting, it has been possible for the first time to determine the frequency, magnitude and 
distribution of stock-outs at the point of delivery in primary care facilities. It was found that 
across the 15-month study period, average weekly health facility total ACT stock-out rates 
were 29%, although short-term, non-response among reporting units may mean actual 
levels are higher. Moreover, of particular concern is that ACT stock-outs averaged around 
40% during the rainy season of March-May 2012. These overall results are disappointing 
considering the pilot programme demonstrated promising results, where stock-outs of 
three out of the four doses of ACT were greatly reduced or eliminated after the 21-week 
pilot study period in three districts (Barrington et al 2010b). A similar pilot study undertaken 
in Kenya in 87 health facilities across 26 weeks from mid-2011-mid-2012 found that 5% 
ACT stock-out identified at the start of the SMS for Life programme was completely 
eliminated by the end (Githinji et al. 2013). Considering ACT is both lifesaving and 
available to Tanzania through various donor assistance programmes, these long and 
persistent stock-outs highlight an unacceptable situation. These are evidence of severe 
and prolonged health system failures which deserve prompt response at local, national 
and global level.    
 
Various factors could account for these periods of stock-outs. At national policy level, the 
current system is designed in such a way that Tanzania forecasts its needs for ACT in 
discussion with the Global Fund and relies entirely on donor support for its supply (Ministry 









Figure 5.4  Chronology of important procurement and supply events for artemisinin 
combination therapy on Tanzania mainland, 2004 to 2012 
 
PMI has intervened numerous times in the public sector and in 2012 provided over half the 
total amount of ACT (55%), whilst the rest was provided under the Affordable Medicines 
Facility - malaria (AMFm) initiative through the Global Fund (AMFm Independent 
Evaluation Team 2012), aimed at increasing universal access to malaria medicines (Adeyi 
and Atun 2010).  
 
Increased reliance on funding partners raises the risk of creating a moral hazard where 
records indicate that the Tanzanian government has reduced its malaria budget from USD 
5.2 million in 2006-2007 to USD 2.0 million in 2008-2009 (President's Malaria Initiative 
(PMI) USAID 2013), a trend identified across other countries that have reduced their 
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domestic funding to health subsequent to increased donor funding (Lu et al. 2010). 
Relying on donor support puts Tanzania at risk of having to abide by external rules and 
processes; for example, the delay in Global Fund Round 7 application in 2009 for almost 
two years was a consequence of  changes in grant architecture including consolidating 
various rounds that included malaria under one grant as ‘Single Stream Funding’ and 
having to restructure the grant to host the new AMFm (AMFm Independent Evaluation 
Team 2012;The Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria 2011). Since the 
government could not foresee this delay it had no plans to mitigate the shortage. As a 
result, during 2009 and 2010 Tanzania had to rely on various PMI emergency ACT 
procurements (another moral hazard), in addition to using residual funds from Round 4 
and reprogramming funds from the initial Round 7 grant for emergency ACT procurement 
(Figure 5.4).  
 
Only in the second quarter of 2011 did AMFm-funded ACT for the public sector enter the 
market. The entry of AMFm resulted in a dramatic price reduction of ACT for Tanzania. 
Despite this price reduction in 2012, Tanzania received from AMFm and PMI a monthly 
average number of doses of 0.9 million, 25% less than the estimated required 1.2 million 
doses per month calculated from the yearly ACT consumption, taken from the Round 9 
Proposal from Tanzania (The Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria 2009a). 
The roll out of AMFm into the public sector followed the introduction of AMFm in the 
private sector.  The private sector was less bureaucratically constrained in accessing the 
AMFm mechanism and was able to move rapidly to acquire co-paid product. This could 
also explain why the public sector did not receive sufficient quantities in the early stages of 




Another policy change which could impact ACT stock was the rollout of mRDTs where 
other things being equal, one could expect a reduced ACT demand following an mRDT 
negative confirmation. Unfortunately SMS for Life did not record stocks of mRDTs.  
  
At local level, ACT together with other essential medicines are delivered to health facilities 
through a “pull” system, requiring health facility workers to manually fill in orders for 
medicines. They further submit these quarterly to the DMO, who forwards the requests to 
the MSD to pack individual health kits. The delivery of ACT in this study took place during 
a change in delivery system from a system where previously the MSD was responsible for 
delivery from the central warehouse via its nine zonal stores to the districts, where the 
DMO was then responsible for storing and delivering them to health facilities. However in 
2011, the MSD changed policy to ‘Direct Delivery’ where the MSD delivers medicine 
packages directly to the health facilities (USAID Deliver Project 2011). If health facility 
workers do not place orders, they do not receive medicines or other commodities.  
 
Furthermore, as there is weak reconciliation between the health information system and 
the medicines ordering system, it is impossible for the health system to assess whether 
health facility workers are ordering sufficient quantities to cater for the disease profile of 
the community they serve. The Tanzania procurement and supply logistics system 
requires that health facility orders be made quarterly, based on the consumption/usage 
from the previous quarter. The formula for ordering includes a buffer stock of two months, 
but such ordering systems can be confused by seasonal demand and by stock-outs if they 
occur. Even with precise and adequate ordering, stock-outs at front-line levels can occur 
when commodities are not in full supply at regional or national levels. This type of stock-




Prevalence of malaria and the need for treatment varies geographically across Tanzania. 
Figure 5.3 suggests that stock-out rates are higher and of greater duration in areas of high 
prevalence compared to low prevalence, as might be expected when there are limitations 
in supply. A key implication of such consistently higher stock-out rates in areas of higher 
prevalence is that populations, especially children in most need of anti-malarial treatments, 
are unable to obtain them from their local health facility.  
 
Assuming that Tanzania orders sufficient quantities of ACT, contributing factors to stock-
outs could be poor distribution or leakage of ACT. A study of the diversion of anti-malarial 
medicines in Africa found that the largest share of diverted anti-malarials came from 
Tanzania, particularly ACT, which were found in private pharmacies in Accra and Lagos, 
Nigeria (Bate et al. 2010). Additionally, there are recent reports  that some ACT purchased 
from a street market in Angola in early 2013 were part of a shipment that was originally 
donated by either PMI or the Global Fund to Tanzania (Faucon et al. 2013). However, as 
this study reported, in 2012 90% of ACT doses shipped were documented by SMS for Life 
as arriving to front-line public health facilities.  This figure is surprising considering that 
11% of health facilities in 2012 did not report. Several explanations could contribute to this, 
firstly, the assumption that any increase in supply from one week to the next corresponds 
to a delivery maybe incorrect, where possibly the increase was just due to undercounting 
in the previous week. Secondly, additional supplies could have entered the system from 
previous deliveries in 2011. Lastly, the missing data correspond disproportionately to 
stock-outs, where some facilities never had ACT and didn't see any point in reporting. 
Whatever the explanation, the 90% figure is conservative and it is clear that there was 




All of these factors suggest that the reasons behind stock-outs could include a complex 
mix of challenges with bureaucracy around vertical purchasing and procurement, issues 
related to distribution strategies in relation to malaria risk, other health system barriers and 
weaknesses in delivery systems, and illegal diversion. All of these challenges contribute 
either directly or indirectly to constrain availability of ACT at front-line health facilities. 
 
Transparency of ACT supply is increasingly being demanded as the situation becomes a 
topic of civil society discussion (HabariLeo 2013;Msikula 2013;The Citizen Reporter 2013). 
SMS for Life reporting is password-protected and directly accessible to only a limited 
group of people in the NMCP, the MSD and PSS. However, all involved in forecasting, 
procurement and delivery of ACT are informed of national stock-outs through the NMCP 
ACT Technical Working Group, and consequently may be unaware of stock-outs at the 
dispensary level. Therefore a policy option available to Tanzania would be to make SMS 
for Life type data publicly available to enable all stakeholders involved in ACT supply and 
provision to obtain information on ACT stocks.  
 
To lower the risk of future ACT stock-outs, Tanzania mainland could consider securing 
subsidized ACT through the AMFm programme and allocate domestic funds to co-finance 
ACT purchase, thereby creating a national buffer and security stock in addition to buffers 
built in to the front-line health facility stocks, and thereby reduce dependency on donors. 
However a buffer or security stock is only of value if health system barriers in supply can 
be overcome. SMS for Life could also be used for setting more accurate minimum stock 
levels at the health facility. Most importantly, DMOs and District Health Management 
Teams (DHMTs) must use the data to make decisions on re-ordering, restocking and 
redistribution among health facilities to minimize short-term stock-outs between ordering 
cycles. A pattern of demand could be plotted and modelled to be able to determine the 
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consumption rates trends and seasonal variations, in order to have a more accurate 
mitigation plan to avoid stock-outs.  
 
This study has some limitations. SMS for Life data included short periods of non-reporting 
by individual health facilities. The high frequency of short-term, non-response in 2012 
could have been due to the lack of immediate response to, and follow-up of, non-reporting 
health facilities by the DMO or the District Malaria Focal Person or possibly also to a lack 
of managing health facility worker administrative data (e g, changes in personnel and 
phone numbers and thus request messages not reaching the right persons). Another 
possible explanation could be that the regions receiving initial training during the pilot   did 
not benefit from a refresher training and subsequently had higher non-reporting rates; for 
example, in the initial three pilot regions, Kigoma, Lindi and Morogoro,  had relatively high 
short-term, non-response rates of between 26 and 37%. Finally, given that stock-outs in 
some facilities were prolonged, the health staff may have thought it not worthwhile to 
report weekly once a stock-out started. 
 
This study was unable to determine whether stock-out rates were higher among non-
reporting units compared to those that did report; if that were the case, then the estimate 
of 30% total ACT stock-out, on average, might be 10-20% too low. Further, this study was 
not able to examine the stock of ACT in the private sector because such data from SMS 
for Life are not available (however the Independent Evaluation of the AMFm Phase 1 does 
include information on ACT availability in the private sector (AMFm Independent 
Evaluation Team 2012). It is likely that the ACT availability would be better as the private 
sector is less affected by constraints in procurement faced by the public sector, in addition, 
the private sector may have better defined incentives or disincentives structures which 




 Conclusions Section 5.06
 
This study investigated ACT availability across public health facilities in Tanzania for 15 
months from October 2011 until the end of 2012 and found that during this period, 29% of 
health facility-weeks were completely stocked out of first-line anti-malarial (ACT). An 
immediate consequence of this was that a significant number of the 14 million cases of 
malaria that Tanzania experiences each year could not receive first-line treatment at a 
public health facility. The principle reasons for not receiving the first line treatment at a 
public health facility and failure of the health system to maintain quality of care was due to 
the heavy reliance on, and difficulties in, compliance with international funding cycles, and 
fundamental delivery system design flaws at national level and subnational level. Both of 
these risks are addressable, and should be done so urgently by Tanzania and its 
development partners to avoid a catastrophic resurgence of malaria mortality in the 
country. With potential ACT resistance, it is imperative that Tanzania secures a stable 
ACT supply with adequate buffer stock, and implements the use of mRDTs to provide the 
population with rational use of an affordable treatment against one of the country’s major 
public health concerns as part of its strategy of ensuring universal coverage for the 
treatment of malaria. Both ACT and mRDTs need to be monitored weekly at central and 
zonal warehousing and at all public front-line health facilities, taking advantage of new 
mHealth innovations, such as SMS for Life. SMS for Life-type systems are useful to 
understand stock availability at point of delivery. More importantly, such real-time 
information needs to be directly used for managing the supply chain, not merely to 
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 Abstract Section 6.01
 
Background: To better understand how stock-outs of the first line antimalarial, 
Artemisinin-based Combination Therapy (ACT) and other non-compliant health worker 
behaviour, influence household expenditures during care-seeking for fever in the Ulanga 
District in Tanzania. Methods: We combined weekly ACT stock data for the period 2009-
2011 from six health facilities in the Ulanga District in Tanzania, together with household 
data from 333 respondents on the cost of fever care-seeking in Ulanga during the same 
time period to establish how health seeking behaviour and expenditure might vary 
depending on ACT availability in their nearest health facility Results: Irrespective of ACT 
stock-outs, more than half (58%) of respondents sought initial care in the public sector, the 
remainder seeking care in the private sector where expenditure was higher by 19%. Over 
half (54%) of respondents who went to the public sector reported incidences of non-
compliant behaviour by the attending health worker (e.g. charging those who were eligible 
for free service or referring patients to the private sector despite ACT stock), which 
increased household expenditure per fever episode from USD0.14 to USD1.76. ACT 
stock-outs were considered to be the result of non-compliant behaviour of others in the 
health system and increased household expenditure by 21%; however we lacked sufficient 
statistical power to confirm this finding. Conclusion: System design and governance 
challenges in the Tanzanian health system have resulted in numerous ACT stock-outs and 
frequent non-compliant public sector health worker behaviour, both of which increase out-
of-pocket health expenditure. Interventions are urgently needed to ensure a stable supply 





 Background Section 6.02
 
Universal Coverage 
The key goals of universal coverage as outlined in the World Health Report 2011 require 
knowledge about: the proportion of the population covered by health services, together 
with widening the range of available services and reducing the proportion of total costs 
born by individuals (World Health Organization 2010). In order to meet these objectives, 
some countries have focused their efforts on achieving universal coverage for selected 
health topics by developing essential medicines lists, which, according to the WHO, 
identify medicines that “satisfy the priority health care needs of the population” and should 
be available at prices the public can afford, with assured quality. 
 
Essential Medicines in Tanzania 
Tanzania’s current 2007 National Essential Medicines List includes medicines for 26 
priority conditions, one of which is malaria (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Tanzania 
2007b). Malaria is a leading public health concern in Tanzania especially for children 
under five and pregnant women (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Tanzania and ICF 
Macro 2011). Expenditure on malaria programs make up 19.4% of total health expenditure 
and 1.6% of GDP (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Tanzania 2010b). The disease 
places a large burden on the health sector accounting for around 40% of out-patient 
department visits in 2008 (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Tanzania 2008a). Since 
2006, the first-line antimalarial for uncomplicated malaria in Tanzania is an Artemisin-
based Combination Therapy (ACT) - Artemether lumefantrine (Alu). However, given the 
high costs of ACT, Tanzania was granted USD75 million from the Global Fund to fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (henceforth referred to as the ‘Global Fund’) during its 
Round 4 in 2005 (and currently through Round 9) to purchase ACTs (which come in four 
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doses based on patient weight). Tanzania’s National Malaria Control Programme is 
responsible for forecasting ACT demand and managing Global Fund grants for malaria 
(President's Malaria Initiative 2012), while the Pharmaceutical Supply Unit is charged with 
setting policy on medicines and supplies and budgeting for medicines. It also monitors the 
use of funds and supervises health facilities. The Medical Stores Department (MSD) 
handles ACT procurement, storage and distribution together with other medicines (Boex 
and Msemo 2007). Health facilities order ACT along with other medicines through a ‘pull’ 
system via the Integrated Logistic System (ILS) (Amenyah et al 2005). The ACTs are 
provided at no charge to health facilities and, according to policy, are dispensed free to 
children under the age of five and to adults over 60 years of age (Mubyazi 2004). Those 
covered by a health insurance fund (National Health Insurance Fund or the Community 
Health Fund) (www.nhif.or.tz/) are also exempt from payment at the health facility (Chee 
et al 2002;Humba 2011). Others pay a user fee of TZS1000 (USD0.70) (2007 fee) (Mushi 
2007), although independent confirmation has found this to vary and can be as low as 
TZS500 per visit. According to the Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses 
Guidelines (IMCI), ACTs are given as a presumptive treatment in the absence of 
diagnostic tests when a child reports with fever without other symptoms such as rapid 
breathing or runny nose which could indicate pneumonia or a common cold (WHO and 
UNICEF 2005). Apart from ACT, other antimalarials are Sulphadoxine – Pyrimethamine 
(SP), which is recommended only as intermittent preventive treatment during pregnancy, 
and quinine which is a second-line treatment administered to pregnant women in their first 
trimester (National Malaria Control Programme 2006). 
The design of the ACT procurement and delivery system should ensure availability in the 
public sector. However, Tanzania along with its neighbours, has been experiencing public 
sector ACT stock-outs over the past five years (GIZ and Tanzanian German Programme 
to Support Health TGPSH 2011b;Kangwana et al 2009a;President's Malaria Initiative 
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2012;Sudoi et al 2012;The Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria 
2009b;The PLoS Medicine Editors 2009;Zurovac et al 2007b;Zurovac et al 2008) which 
cripples the delivery of health care services. Our objective is to investigate the impact of 
public sector ACT stock-outs together with health worker behaviour on care-seeking 
during a fever episode and the associated household expenditures. 
 
 
 Methods Section 6.03
 
Data for our case-study were obtained from the Ulanga District in South East Tanzania 
with an estimated population of 265,203 according to the 2012 census and with a malaria 
parasite prevalence rate in children under five years of age as tested by a Rapid 
Diagnostic Test of 13.0% in 2011 (Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS) et al 2012). 
Health service infrastructure in Ulanga is composed of two hospitals (one public), three 
health centres and 30 dispensaries (16 public). The estimated population per facility is 
4,571. We combined data from three surveys carried out in Ulanga District between 
November 2009 and August 2011. 
 
Household behaviour and expenditure 
We used longitudinal survey data on household costs drawing on the International 
Network for the Demographic Evaluation of Populations and Their Health (INDEPTH) 
Effectiveness and Safety Studies of Anti-malarial Drugs in Africa (INESS) methodology, 
starting in September 2009 until present (INDEPTH Network 2013). Rolling daily 
household surveys in the Ifakara Health and Demographic Surveillance Site (HDSS) 
identify fever episodes using a two week recall where a randomly pre-selected group is 
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chosen for an in-depth questionnaire on their behaviour and expenditures. There was no 
clinical verification that a fever episode was a case of malaria. Data on individual treatment 
seeking pathways, access to treatment, outcomes, services at provider level and 
household costs are captured, together with other key indicators such as the different 
treatments and sources of medicines as well as the total cost. Direct financial costs are 
considered to include direct medical costs such as consultation fees, prescription fees and 
charges for medicines, together with non-medical costs such as transport, 
accommodation, food, water and mobile phone use in addition to any gift payments. 
Respondents are grouped into public or private sector based on their first provider, even if 
they received medicines from the other. 
 
Household demographics 
As part of the Ifakara HDSS, households are visited three times a year and once a year an 
asset survey is administered. The socio-economic status of households is based on 15 
dichotomous variables using principle component analysis (PCA) (Filmer and Pritchett 
2001;Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006). The index was constructed for 5,676 of the 
households from the following dichotomous variables: ownership of a bicycle (65% of 
households); radio (69%); mobile phones (43%); watch (6%) and iron (5%); living in rented 
accommodation (11%); as well as various characteristic of the dwelling such as: mud floor 
(83%); cement floor (9%); stone walls (33%); brick walls (6%); grass roof (9%); tin roof 
(1%) ; kerosene fuel (20%); electricity (2%) and type of sanitary facilities including 
presence of toilet (94%). The first principle component explained 23% of the variability in 
socio-economic scores. Greatest weight was given to having a cement floor (0.38), the 
use of kerosene for cooking fuel (0.34) and ownership of a mobile phone (0.30). 
Households were classified into wealth quintiles based on their PCA sores and assigned 
their own socio-economic scores index. Household and health facility Geographic 
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Information Systems (GIS) coordinates were also collected in the HDSS. Health facility 
catchment areas were determined using the ArcGIS software (Esri 2012) to create 1km 
Euclidian buffers around health facilities. 
 
SMS for life 
We used information provided by the SMS for Life project  (Barrington et al 2010a) which 
monitors weekly stock-levels via a mobile phone Short Messaging System (SMS) on all 
four dose levels of the ACT Coartem in 35 health facilities in Ulanga, of which eight were 
also covered by the Ifakara HDSS. Of these eight, we excluded two as they were in the 
same village and therefore could not be associated with individual catchment households 
resulting in a total of six health facilities included (five dispensaries and one health centre). 
We identified the number and pattern of weeks where they were stocked out of all four 
doses of ACT. ACT stock-out was defined when all four ACT doses were stocked out 
since health workers cope with a stock-out of one dose by dividing blister packets from 
others. If in a given week the health worker did not respond to the SMS, this was 
considered a stock-out only if it was a preceded or followed by a reported stock-out. From 
(and including) November 2009 until (and including) August 2011, there were 576 health 
facility weeks of data of which 82 (14%) reported total stock-out. 
 
Informed consent was obtained for this study from the Tanzania National Institute for 
Medical Research (NIMR/HQ/R.8a/Vol.IX/998). 
 
Univariate logistic models were fitted to assess the effect of predictors on household 
expenditure during care seeking for fever and whether these varied across wealth 




We defined non-compliance for user fee charges in the public sector as charging patients 
user fees contrary to policy (i.e. for patients who were under the age of five or over the age 
of 60 or who were covered by health insurance) or when individuals who did not qualify for 
one of the above exemptions were charged over TZS1,000 (using the higher user fee). 
Non-compliance for medicines management was defined as cases where a fee of more 
than TZS1,000 was charged in the public sector for medicines as ACTs were supposed to 
be dispensed for TZS300 (or free), and a combination of antipyretic and other basic 
medicines would cost no more than TZS1,000. Non-compliance for medicines 
management was also defined in cases when a monotherapy (SP or quinine) was 
dispensed, either in the public or private sector, apart from when this was given for free in 
a public sector facility to a female of reproductive age, according to Standard Treatment 
Guidelines for women in their first trimester of pregnancy who should receive quinine for 
the treatment of uncomplicated malaria (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Tanzania 
2007b). Referral to the private sector to purchase medicines during stock-in periods was 
also considered non-compliant behaviour by health workers. Fever cases not receiving an 
antimalarial were not considered as non-compliant as there may have been other 
symptoms that suggested another diagnosis, or a negative test from a Rapid Diagnostic 
Test. We believe that ACT stock-outs in the public sector are in part a result of the inability 
of healthcare workers to reliably ensure that medicines are ordered appropriately and on 
time (in addition to non-compliant behaviour of individuals higher up on the supply chain) 
and therefore incidents of care seeking during an ACT stock-out were also attributed to 
non-compliant behaviour of health workers. Furthermore, we believe that it is reasonable 
to assume that the cost of non-compliant behaviour in the public sector resulting in stock-
outs also results in costs experienced by households seeking care (purchasing ACTs) in 
the private sector if these occurred during an ACT stock-out. This is because only 9% of 
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total care seeking chose the private sector during times when the public sector was 
stocked in, as well as the fact that news of public sector ACT stock-outs spreads quickly in 
times of frequent stock-outs of commonly sought products. Some patients may therefore 
go directly to nearby private sector facilities for treatment. While these costs may not have 
arisen directly as a consequence of non-compliant health worker behaviour, they 
nonetheless would not have arisen if health staff and others in the procurement and supply 
chain system had been ‘compliant’ with their own policies and processes to avoid stock-
outs. Finally, the cost to the household of non-compliance may be defined as the 
difference between the average direct cost for compliant behaviour and the average direct 
cost for the non-compliant behaviour. 
 
 Results Section 6.04
 
General characteristics 
There were 439 INESS fever interviews in the Ulanga District between November 2009 
and August 2011. From these, we excluded respondents whose closest health facility was 
not one of the six, or who sought treatment from another source such as from a friend or 
family, or a traditional healer. We also excluded respondents who went to a hospital as 
this involved cases of complicated malaria requiring inpatient care. Two outliers were 
removed as they reported excessively high costs (TZS12,000 on medicines). Of the 
remaining 333 fever cases, 192 (58%) sought initial care from the public sector and 141 
(42%) from the private sector. The most common private sector outlets were Accredited 
Drug Dispensing Outlets (ADDOs) (62%); others went to private pharmacies and shops. 
86% of fever cases received an antimalarial (ACT, quinine or SP) (see Figure 6.1) of 
which the most common was ACT (72%). The rest took an antipyretic such as aspirin, 





Figure 6.1: Distribution of medicines taken for fever, by source, in the Ulanga 
district, Tanzania, November 2009 – August 2011 
 
ACT and quinine were most commonly obtained from the public sector, whilst SP was 
predominantly obtained in the private sector. The majority (58%) of those who received SP 
were men, against policy. 
The costs experienced by respondents seeking treatment in each of the two sectors 




















































Figure 6.2: Cost (TZS) of fever treatment in both the public and private sector, 
Ulanga, Tanzania, November 2009 – August 2011 
Note: Non medical costs include: food, water, lodging, phone, gift payments. 
TZS 1,434 = USD1 (average exchange rate during the study period 2009- 2011). Source: 
Bank of Tanzania. There were no consultation costs in the private sector 
 
 
The total direct cost of seeking treatment for fever was TZS285 (19%) higher in the private 
than in the public sector (95% CI: 139 – 857). This was largely due to higher (73%) 
average medical costs where the difference between both means was TZS736 (95% CI: 
428 – 1044). Non medical costs where also nearly four times higher (95% CI: 124 – 448) 
in the private sector compared to the public sector, although transport costs were lower. In 
addition, patients seeking care in the private sector were not charged a consultation fee, 
which made up about one-quarter of the direct public sector treatment. 
A more detailed breakdown of these costs, showing cases which were subjected to non-
compliant behaviour of any sort by health care workers can be seen from Figure 6.3. Non-
compliant behaviour was relatively more common in the public sector, with over-charging 







Figure 6.3: Care seeking and average direct costs during fever episodes in Ulanga, 
Tanzania, November 2009 – August 2011 
*Note that the number of non-compliant cases in the public sector does not sum to total 
non compliant cases due to some individuals experiencing more than one non -compliant 
behaviour at the health facility during fever treatment 
 
Cost of non-compliant behaviour 
The cost of non-compliant health worker and health system behaviour in the Ulanga 
District for those seeking fever treatment in the period 2009-2011 is estimated as USD1.62 
or TZS2,322 per episode of fever. When health-workers and shop workers are compliant, 
the cost is lower in the public sector than the private sector (USD0.96, TZS1,372). 
Total: 333 -TZS1,608 
Public: 193 (58%) -TZS1,488  Private: 140 (42%) -TZS1,774 
Compliant: 88 (46%) -TZS201 
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However, in non-compliant cases, the reverse is true with the cost of care being marginally 
lower in the private sector compared to the public sector (USD0.27, TZS387). 
 
Stock-out analysis 
Out of the total sample, 7% of respondents sought treatment for fever during an ACT 
stock-out and their direct costs were 21% higher at TZS1,921 (95% CI: 1251, 2590) 
compared to those who sought treatment during a stock-in [TZS1,584 (95% CI: 1353, 
1815)]. The majority of these patients (79%) received their medicines from the private 
sector which explains the high direct costs. Of these, 53% obtained an ACT. Due to the 
small sample size of respondents seeking care during an ACT stock-out, we were unable 
to confirm whether the increase in costs during fever seeking was statistically significant (p 
= 0.44). 
PCA scores were available for 286 households and regression analysis suggested that 
those in the higher socio-economic quintile tended to use the private sector more, 
although the difference was not statistically significant. The consumption of antimalarials 
did not vary significantly across socio-economic quintiles, although the poorest were more 
likely to take a (cheaper) antipyretic. Healthcare seeking expenses did not vary 
significantly across socio-economic quintiles, although those in the higher socio-economic 
quintile tended to spend more (TZS126, 95% CI: -14.78 – 267.14, p = 0.08). 
 
Limitations 
The INESS data included hospitalization costs which were a lump sum of medical costs, 
laboratory costs and bed costs. As some respondents who went to a dispensary reported 
only hospitalization costs, we distributed these costs between medicines (80%) and 
consultation (20%) on the basis of the observed average distribution among respondents 
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who incurred both costs. There were also inconsistencies in the household data where for 
example, people going to a private shop reported having bed costs, or reporting no cost. 
Also, it is likely that the two week recall of respondents would have affected data quality. 
Finally, SMS for Life includes long periods of non-reporting; for example, in 2011, more 
than one in three weeks (37%) had missing data. Furthermore, SMS for Life only counts 
boxes in the store room, not in the dispensing room, therefore ACT stock-out rates could 
be inflated. 
 
 Discussion Section 6.05
 
The frequent ACT stock-outs which have occurred in Tanzania have not been well 
documented in the literature. The aim of this case-study was to better understand 
household behaviour and expenditures during care-seeking for fever in the Ulanga District 
and whether they varied during an ACT stock-out. However, from our results stock-outs 
accounted for a relatively small proportion (less than 10%) of the non-compliant behaviour 
in the system experienced by respondents when attending the public health facilities for 
treatment. By far, the largest contributor to non-compliant behaviour was overcharging for 
medicines and/or consultations and not respecting health insurance status, as also noted 
in Tanzania by others (HERA 2006;Laterveer et al. 2004;Maestad and Mwisongo 2007). 
Non-compliant health worker behaviour has also been found in other African countries 
such as Uganda (McPake et al 1999;Zurovac et al 2008) Ethiopia (Lindelow and Serneels 
2006) and Zambia (Zurovac et al 2007b). 
Over charging for services or goods that are supposed to be free could be an outcome of 
various dysfunctional elements across the health system. Within the information system, 
over charging could be a result of lack of information among patients who may be under 
informed on their rights and entitlements. Indeed, during our field visits, we did not observe 
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any posters displayed at health facilities stating the fee for service or patient rights. 
Similarly, lack of information could be occurring on the supply side where health facility 
staff are unaware of the fee-for-service guidelines. Health system stewards could consider 
strengthening information flows by designing interventions aimed at increasing health 
worker training on user fee policies followed by reminder messages using mobile phones. 
Overcharging could also be occurring due to weaknesses in the financing system 
especially with regards to payment of salaries to health workers, who may be overcharging 
as a coping mechanism, either because of salary delays or because funding to the health 
facility is irregular and limited. If this is the case, then stewards would need to review the 
remuneration system for health workers and streamline the flow of funds to health 
facilities. Another potential intervention could be to allow more access to funds received at 
the health facilities through cost sharing schemes such as insurance funds which could 
then be used to purchase medicines from other sources when needed. This would reduce 
the frequency of stock-outs and informal charges, empower the health workers, and build 
trust in the health care system among the community. 
Over-charging for health care services results in a dual burden to the health system, both 
by potentially discouraging patients from receiving care, and possibly impoverishing them 
when they do seek care. Considering that the commodity supply cost of ACTs together 
with other technologies used to prevent malaria such as bed nets and Rapid Diagnostic 
Tests are nearly fully donor funded in Tanzania, it is perhaps surprising that the 2009/2010 
National Health Accounts found that approximately 40% of total malaria expenditure came 
from households (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Tanzania 2010b). This is 
particularly concerning as out-of-pocket costs for medicines tend to be the second largest 
family expenditure item after food in developing countries (Cameron et al. 2009), resulting 
in equity and impoverishment implications, together with creating barriers for universal 
coverage. Socio-economic considerations are important as our results indicated that the 
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least poor tended to use the private sector more than the poorest households. There could 
be a combination of demand and supply factors that contribute to this observation, on the 
demand side, the least poor may want to avoid long queues and therefore go directly to 
the private sector to purchase medicines. On the supply side, unpublished work from the 
Ifakara HDSS running in this district has geo-positioned all households and has socio-
economic status of a large sample of households, it shows that the least poor quintile is 
more commonly located in the centre of large villages (merchants, teachers, other elites, 
etc) while the poorest are more scattered and distributed in and between small villages 
(peasant farmers, etc.)a. The implication of this is that the poor rely on the public health 
care system to provide health services, and when these are either not available, or not 
accessible, it becomes an indicator of health system failure. 
At just under 10% of the non-compliant behaviour observed in our study, ACT stock-outs 
are a serious issue for those experiencing them, especially when they concern essential 
medicines for a leading cause of a life threatening condition. Stock-outs are a result of a 
combination of governance challenges and weak system design. The design of the current 
system is such that Tanzania relies entirely on donor support for its ACTs, most of which 
comes from the Global Fund and President’s Malarial Initiative (PMI) (Ministry of Health 
and Social Welfare Tanzania 2008b).  Relying on donor support puts Tanzania at risk of 
having to abide by external bureaucratic requirements. For example, a report by the Local 
Fund Agent for the Global Fund in 2009 reported stock management issues which resulted 
in the Global Fund withholding around USD 1.2million for the purchase of ACTs (The 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria 2007). A delay in Round 7 application 
was a consequence of having to restructure the grant to host the innovative financing 
mechanism ‘Affordable Medicines Facility for malaria’ (AMFm) which aimed to lower the 
price of ACTs (AMFm Independent Evaluation Team 2012). This resulted in Tanzania only 
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submitting their proposal in June 2009 and signing the AMFm a year later (Independent 
Evaluator team 2012;The Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria 2011). 
Another health system design feature which would have contributed to the ACT stock-out 
was the nature of the supply chain system which is based on a ‘pull’ system. That is, 
medicines availability is entirely based on whether health facilities order the correct 
amount of medicines at the right time from MSD. 
Tanzania could consider redesigning the medicine supply system to simplify the way that 
funds are transferred to the MSD for procurement. Understanding the resource constraints 
of health budgets in developing countries, Tanzania could take the opportunity of 
subsidised ACTs through the AMFm program (first orders were received July 2011) to 
allocate a small portion of domestic funds to co-finance ACT purchases, including creating 
a buffer stock which would mitigate future stock-outs. With the introduction of Rapid 
Diagnostic Tests to accurately diagnose malaria, fewer ACT doses will be required. Health 
system stewards could also consider carrying out an external assessment of the 
medicines quantification, procurement and supply system to identify and address barriers, 
potentially considering moving towards a system which did not rely entirely on health 
workers placing medicines orders in on time. 
There are also a range of governance challenges centred around lack of accountability 
and transparency which can contribute to stock-outs. Tools like SMS for Life can greatly 
increase transparency of medicines stocks and identify where the barriers are, but this is 
only if they are being widely accessed, which at present it is not due to the website being 
password protected. Therefore, many involved in the forecasting, procurement and 
delivery of ACTs may be unaware of stock-outs at the dispensary level as they only 
monitor stock levels in the national or zonal warehouse. If there was more transparency, 
perhaps accountability would increase along the supply chain and which may reduce any 
unjustifiable referral to the private sector, especially when ACTs are in stock. 
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Our results indicate that in a stock-out period household expenditure during care seeking 
for fever increased (this was not statistically significant). However, average district ACT 
stock-out rates are increasing. For 2009, 2010, and 2011, district ACT stock-out rates 
were, respectively, 8.3%, 11.4% and 34.1%, and so a district analysis today may yield 
statistically significant increases in household expenditure results. The predominant 
periods of ACT stock-outs were November 2009; July to August 2010; and the most 
severe was between March – August 2011, corresponding to the peak period of malaria 
transmission. Thus, in addition to the economic consequences of ACT stock-outs, it would 
not be unreasonable to expect sever health consequences in affected communities, 
although this remains to be established. 
The irregular public sector ACT availability could have been one of the principal factors 
contributing to nearly half the respondents going to the private sector for fever treatment, 
especially since cost of care in the private sector for fever treatment was only slightly 
higher (19%) than in the public sector. Our case-study does not examine the private sector 
ACT stock, which may have been higher following the earlier introduction of AMFm funded 
ACTs compared to the public sector. Another factor dissuading patients from seeking care 
at public health facilities was the prevalent practice of over-charging. Over charging (an 
average, per case, of TZS200 per patient) was also reported in a GIZ 2011 study on the 
availability of medicines which found in one district that health facilities were overcharging 
patients to pay for security services (GIZ and Tanzanian German Programme to Support 
Health TGPSH 2011b). 
Our overall costing results differ from those of Somi et al. (2007) who calculated the direct 
cost of fever/malaria treatment in the same Ifakara HDSS site in 2004 and found the public 
sector to be 61% more expensive that the private sector (Somi et al. 2007). Using GDP 
deflators from the World Bank, the average direct cost in 2004 was TZS1,184, 50% or so 
higher than the average cost during our study (TZS767). A direct comparison is difficult 
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because in 2004 the first line antimalarial was SP which was at the time much more 
inexpensive than ACT. Choloroquine was also still popular in the shops and very 
inexpensive. 
The annual number of malaria cases reported in public health facilities in Tanzania is 
estimated at between 14 – 18 million (USAID 2012). If over half of these cases 
experienced additional costs (USD1.62) due to the non-compliant behaviour of health 
system employees, the estimated total additional expenditure born by households would 
be between USD12.2 - USD15.7 million. This represents about 3.6 - 4.6% of the total 
health expenditure on malaria in Tanzania (USD340 million (Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare Tanzania 2010b) ). Furthermore, an estimated 68% of the population in 2007 live 
on less that USD1.25 a day (World Bank 2011)  suggesting that their daily income was 
consumed entirely due to governance failures for each fever episode. 
 
 
 Conclusions Section 6.06
We investigated the behaviour and expenditure of households during fever seeking in the 
Ulanga district in Tanzania in 2010 -2011 when the district, like the rest of the country, was 
experiencing frequent periods of ACT stock-out. The main governance issue affecting the 
proper delivery of health services during a fever episode observed in our case-study was 
non-compliant health worker behaviour at public health facilities. Among other things, this 
results in decreasing the cost gap between the private and public sector. Had the public 
sector workers been fully compliant, treatment costs in the private sector would be 
significantly larger than those in the public sector. In addition to over charging for 
medicines and services, another element of public sector worker non-compliant behaviour 
was ACT stock-outs, which we estimate increased the cost of care during fever treatment 
by 21% compared to treatment costs during a stock-in. For those seeking care during an 
ACT stock-out, the majority went to the private sector. Costs in the private sector were 
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19% higher than the public sector which would explain the higher costs for those seeking 
treatment during an ACT stock-out. 
As the ACT stock-out rate in our case-study was low compared to the district average, we 
were unable to fully assess its impact. However, our results demonstrated that there are 
other important governance challenges in the health system that increase household 
expenditure during care-seeking for fever. Now that SMS for Life is operating at a national 
level and as other household costing data sources become available, we encourage a 
larger scale study to assess the national impact on household expenditures of an ACT 
stock-out. Furthermore, an investigation into the long term health consequences of people 
not accessing the first line antimalarial would be important for health services 
management policy. With potential ACT resistance, it is imperative that Tanzania secures 
a stable ACT supply with adequate buffer stock and implements the use of Rapid 
Diagnostic Tests to provide the population with an affordable treatment against one of the 
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“If you want to go quickly, go alone. If you want to go far, go together” 




















This body of research has identified that the lack of attention to developing strong health 
systems in Tanzania has resulted in high levels of unaccounted essential medicines, and 
stockouts of a fully donor-funded, life-saving antimalarial. More generally, this thesis has 
explored the issue of governance in the health system with the aim of contributing to a 
better understanding of the health system challenges in Tanzania that prevent the 
adequate supply of essential medicines to public health facilities, and has attempted to 
quantify the impact on household expenditure when the supply of medicines fails. In 
addition, the findings should inform a more general discussion on supply chain barriers. 
This chapter begins with a review of methodological approaches, followed by a discussion 
that synthesizes the main research findings with reference to the original objectives 
described in chapter two. Finally, the overall implications of these results for the supply of 
essential medicines in resource constrained environments are discussed and 
recommendations for further research and development are made. 
 
 
 Methodological issues Section 7.01
 
The research for this thesis was carried out within two rural districts in Tanzania, both 
being part of the Tanzanian HDSS system (Armstrong Schellenberg et al 2002). The 
HDSS provides a unique opportunity to collect valuable information from repeated 
household surveys and integrate them using common household codes. However, the 
long-standing presence since 1996 of researchers in the area may influence the way 
people answered survey questions. As households are regularly visited, it is possible that 
they become tired of answering routine questions, with implications for the consistency of 
data quality. The possibility of a “Hawthorne effect” (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939) 
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also needs to be considered whereby the respondents may adapt their behaviour or 
responses as a consequences of the increased attention they receive by being part of the 
HDSS or the SMS for Life project. Consequently, the observations made in this thesis may 
not be representative of the situation in other districts. However to date, there has been no 
evidence of a Hawthorne effect in any of the studies from these districts. 
 
In parallel to our study there was also significant investment being made by the US 
government in training staff for the supply chain system and strengthening service delivery 
for certain programs (President's Malaria Initiative 2011;President's Malaria Initiative 2012) 
which could have influenced the way health workers respond.  It is uncertain which 
districts these programs were rolled out in; however if they were carried out in our study 
districts they may have resulted in health workers performing better in terms of requesting 
medicines, and thus this thesis may underestimate the true governance issues which we 
set out to explore. 
 
Whether the findings in this thesis can be extrapolated to the rest of Tanzania depends on 
each component.  The initial framework developed to assess governance (chapter 3) is 
not Tanzania-specific and could certainly be applied to any country and to any health 
system concern. For the analysis comparing both medicines delivery systems in the Rufiji 
District (chapter 4), the results may provide an optimistic assessment as during the 1999 
data collection the Rufiji District was part of the Tanzania Essential Health Interventions 
Project which involved significant interaction with health facility workers. This could mean 
that the findings on the accountability of medicines in 1999 were in fact better than the 
national average.  Regarding malaria (see chapters 5 and 6), it is likely that malaria 
awareness and therefore treatment is better in the study area than the rest of Tanzania 
due to the activities of the HDSS. For example, from the 2012 Tanzania HIV/AIDS and 
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Malaria Indicator Survey, the national percentage of children under five with fever who 
took an ACT was 33.6% whilst in the Morogoro Region (where the Ulanga District is) this 
was 52% (no results for Pwani Region which include the Rufiji District) (Tanzania 
Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS) et al 2012).  Therefore the results presented for fever-
seeking treatment in chapter 6 of this thesis may in fact be more optimistic than the reality 
in the country. In the same section, we report that only 7% of respondents sought care for 
fever during an ACT stockout; this is much lower than the district average of 39% and the 
national average of 29%. Therefore our estimate of the additional costs associated with 
stockouts of 21% could be an underestimate.  Finally, we define an ACT stockout as a 
stockout of all four doses of ACT, as a fully functioning well governed system should 
always provide access to all four doses. However, there may be periods when a health 
facility is stocked out of one dose of ACT requiring the health worker to divide or combine 
other pack sizes. While this coping mechanism is undesirable, it would not be reflected as 
a stockout in this thesis. Therefore the estimated stockout rates presented in this thesis 
would under-report those expected to prevail in a fully functioning health system. 
 
The costing element of this thesis (chapter 6) relies entirely on secondary data collection, 
including ACT stock reports from health workers, cost of health care seeking during fever 
and routine reports from health facilities.  As such, it is prone to errors in data quality: we 
have attempted to correct these wherever possible, such as health facility workers 
reporting the number of doses in stock instead of boxes, or field interviews reporting 






 Contribution to understanding health system governance Section 7.02
 
Based on the specific objectives defined for this thesis, the following section reviews the 
contributions that this research has made to improving our understanding of health system 
governance.  We also discuss how this framework can be empirically applied to other 
areas of the health system.  
 
7.2.1 Objective 1 -  To define a framework for the assessment of governance within 
a health system 
The initial contribution of this thesis was to develop a framework to assess governance in 
the health system (chapter 3). The framework developed was based heavily on 
contemporary literature including the WHO 2007 framework where the six health system 
building blocks were first defined (WHO 2007), as well as the governance elements 
outlined in Siddiqi et al. (2009) (Siddiqi et al 2009). The framework presented in this thesis 
rearranges the building blocks to better represent the various interactions in the health 
system, whereby service delivery is seen as the central point where the health system 
interacts with patients and governance is the overarching building block influencing the 
other four building blocks (human resources, medicines and technology, information and 
financing). Other frameworks have been developed to assess governance in health 
systems (Islam 2007;Lewis and Pettersson 2009;Siddiqi et al 2009;WHO 2008b), often 
proposing a check list of questions to answer, which are in some instances more idealistic 
than realistic. The framework presented in this thesis differs from these efforts in that it 
highlights the dynamics between the building blocks, stressing the importance of feedback 
information flows as highlighted in Paina and Peters (2012) (Paina and Peters 2012). The 
framework proposes a practical tool to assess governance across the health system. It 
does not define a set of questions to ask. Instead, the important difference compared to 
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other frameworks is that it is designed to start from a certain governance issue which 
constrains the health system and guides the evaluator to assess comprehensively various 
elements of the governance failure across the system to identify the most promising entry 
points for system-level governance interventions. In summary, our framework suggests 
that a well governed health system should have clear goals based on a certain degree of 
participation of relevant stakeholders, especially those who provide the services as well as 
from disadvantaged groups who may have less power to influence polices, and from which 
transparent policies are designed and adhered to by promoting accountability and 
reducing the risk of corruption.  
 
7.2.2: Objective 2 - To empirically apply the framework in Tanzania 
The framework developed as part of this thesis is really only of value if it can be applied 
empirically. The application of the framework requires identification of a governance issue 
which constrains the health system from operating effectively to act as a starting point. 
This thesis applies the framework developed under Objective 1 to the issue of irregular 
supply of essential medicines, with a particular focus on stockout of antimalarials, as the 
availability of medicines at health facilities is a crucial element of service delivery quality. 
Stockouts of essential medicines are a barrier to the health system achieving its goals of 
improving both the overall level of health and health equality whist at the same time 
protecting people from financial hardship and responding rapidly to the legitimate health 
needs of the population. Using the framework, we identify serious weakness across the 






                   
Figure 7.1: Application of health system governance framework to the issue of 
stockout of essential medicines in Tanzania 
 
The first key finding of this thesis is that the recently developed ‘pull’ system rolled out in 
2009 has not resulted in an overall improvement in accountability of essential medicines in 
the public system in Tanzania. In addition, Tanzania has been experiencing stockouts of 
the first line antimalarial, ACT. Possible reasons for this are illustrated in Figure 7.1 across 
the various areas of the health system. These barriers are also interconnected; so, for 
example, unskilled health workers have an impact on the quality of the information system; 
late payment of wages would be expected to be a disincentive for health workers to 
complete ordering forms for medicines on time and may result in higher absenteeism rates 
across health facilities. There are also importance feedback loops whereby the stockout of 
medicines can influence the performance across the system. For example, health workers 
may be less inclined to spend time on lengthy medicines order calculations if they have 
not received feedback from their previous orders. The end result of these barriers 
identified in Figure 7.1 and the complex and dynamic nature of the health system is that if 
Unpaid or delayed wages to health staff. 
System does not allow health facilities to 
retain funds from user fees or health 
insurance contributions for the purchase of 
medicines during stockout.  
Unskilled health workers with 
insufficient training to carry out 
both health services and health 
administration 
Paper based information system requiring 
manual quantifications done at health facility 
level. No reconciliation with the ordering 
system for medicines.  
Paper based medicines ordering 
system requiring manual quantifications 
done by health facility workers every 
three months for over 100 products 
127 
 
orders are not placed in time, then health facilities will not receive the delivery of 
medicines that they require. 
 
Underlying all of these issues discussed across the four health system areas is 
governance, of which probably the most important factor that would explain the lack of 
medicines availability, is accountability.  This thesis found limited accountability across the 
health system which resulted in the persistently high percentage of unaccounted essential 
medicines. For example, within human resources, health workers are not held accountable 
when medicines orders are not submitted, nor are DMOs held accountable when 
medicines orders are submitted to the central MSD with errors in calculations. Health 
workers are not held accountable when they do not submit yearly booklets containing 
health information statistics and districts are not held accountable when health information 
booklets are missing from their records. The cumulative result of this lack of accountability 
is that it is becomes increasingly more difficult to account for medicines consumption by 
reconciling data from the HIS and ILS tools, as demonstrated in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
Within the information function of the health system, tools like SMS for Life have been 
designed to improve transparency (which is needed for better accountability). However, as 
of now, no one has been held to account for the persistent stockout of ACT in Tanzania as 
SMS for Life is not widely accessed. There is limited accountability in the financing system 
at the highest level when funds from the Ministry of Health are not transferred in time to 
the MSD for the purchase of medicines, which has resulted in a large debt accumulation at 
the MSD. The MSD is in turn unable to hold the Ministry of Health to account due to its 
parastatal status. At the international level, donors are putting more pressure on countries 
like Tanzania to account for funds spent and increasingly request progress reports. 
Questions could be raised as to whether institutions such as the Global Fund should be 
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held to account for piloting programs like the AMFm in Tanzania which ultimately slowed 
down the local funding application process for ACTs. 
 
These constraints are, by and large, all interconnected, with bottlenecks and failures in 
one part of the system (e.g. the health information system) having a clear impact on the 
ability of other parts of the system (e.g. medicines delivery; financing) to function 
effectively. While this may make the design of interventions more complex, it also means 
that efforts to improve governance in one area of the health system by addressing specific 
concerns are likely to have flow-on benefits in other areas. 
 
An important contribution of this thesis is to highlight that even though the stockout of 
essential medicines is an issue central to the ‘medicines and technology’ function, as 
defined by the health system, there are many other contributing factors across the health 
system which both influence, and are influenced by, medicines availability. The findings of 
this thesis on medicines availability are similar to what was found by the German 
Development Agency (GIZ) in their 2011 report  (GIZ and Tanzanian German Programme 
to Support Health TGPSH 2011a) which identified limitations in health worker capacity, 
and also to that of McPake and colleagues (1999) who found that medicines leakages 
resulted in reduced availability of health workers at the point of service, reduced health 
service utilization rates and reduced medicines availability in Uganda in 1996 (McPake et 
al 1999). This thesis did not look into issues of corruption; however, incidents of medicines 
theft have been reported in the press (Siyame 2012a;The Citizen 2011).  
 
Having identified areas of weaknesses in the design and governance of the medicines 
supply system, we focused on the availability of the first line antimalarial ACT, for two 
reasons. Primarily, because malaria is second only to HIV/AIDS in terms of its contribution 
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to disease burden in Tanzania and antimalarials for children are a life-saving intervention. 
Second, because since 2005 Tanzania has been receiving funds from the Global Fund to 
purchase ACT in the public sector.  
 
The second major finding of this thesis was to capture the extent of the ACT stockout in 
Tanzania over a study period of 15 months, using results from approximately 4000 health 
facilities who provided data through the SMS for Life tool. We found an average of 29% of 
health facilities at any one point in time were stocked out of all four doses of ACT. These 
results are disappointing considering that the pilot program demonstrated promising 
results, whereby stockouts of three out of the four ACT were greatly reduced or eliminated 
after the 21 week pilot study period in three districts (Barrington et al 2010a). A similar pilot 
study undertaken in Kenya in 87 health facilities across 26 weeks from mid 2011 – mid 
2012 found that at the start of the SMS for Life program there was only a 5% ACT stockout 
which was completely eliminated at the end of the pilot (Githinji et al 2013). Considering 
ACT are both life saving and available to Tanzania though various donor assistance 
programs, these long and persistent stockouts surely highlight an unacceptable situation 
and evidence of a severe and prolonged health system failure to which there appears to 
have been no response at the local, national or global level. In addition, during the period 
of study under this thesis, there have been no initiatives taken to improve the transparency 
or ownership of SMS for Life, potentially on purpose to avoid public scrutiny and demands 
for information about the reasons behind the ACT stockout.  
 
 In addition to the health system design features of the medicines delivery system 
discussed at the start of this section, the frequent prolonged periods of ACT stockout 
identified in this research can be largely attributed to the design of the ACT supply system. 
Tanzania relies entirely on donors for the financing of all ACT (the Global Fund and the 
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President’s Malaria Initiative) and therefore is at the mercy of donor priorities and 
procedures to obtain funds for procurement. The perils of this volatile relationship were 
highlighted during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis when donors reigned in their 
commitments and required greater transparency about the use of funds, even setting the 
precedent of installing a set of conditions which Tanzania was required to fulfil before the 
release of each round of funding.  As seen in Figure 7.2, changes in Global Fund funding 
for ACTs through the introduction of the AMFm resulted in severe grant funding delays  
and a serious disruption to supply of medicines as a result of the significant delay in the 
signing of the Round 7 grant. 
 




In parallel with bureaucratic delays at the international level, officials from the NMCP have 
blamed the reduced capacity of suppliers to produce sufficient ACT (The Citizen 2012).  
Despite these challenges, Tanzania could have mitigated some of the impact of ACT 
stockouts had it possibly taken a more proactive approach to the warning given by the 
Global Fund and the PMI in 2008 that stockouts were imminent (as seen in Figure 7.2). 
 
The design features of the supply of ACT as discussed above, both at the international 
and national level, have undoubtedly contributed to the persistent stockout of ACTs since 
2009. Prolonged periods of ACT stockout raise governance questions as to who and why 
the system was designed in this way, and why so little has been done to correct system 
failures? A possible explanation for the inertia in the design of the system is the inherent 
value of ACT which may increase the risk of leakage. This thesis did not carry out an 
indepth analysis into ACT leakages, but did find that approximately 90% of ACTs shipped 
from Novartis were accounted for in the SMS for Life system in 2012. Leakages, however, 
have  been reported in The Wall Street Journal (31/08/2010) (Bate 2010) and The 
Citizen (21/05/2012) (The Citizen 2011). To understand why the barriers to the regular 
supply of ACT have not been addressed, one would need to assess who benefits from the 
weak design, and what interventions could be designed to strengthen it, for example, by 
increasing the wages of staff involved in the supply of medicines in order to reduce 
incentives to sell public sector-bound ACT to supplement their unpaid or low wages. 
 
This being said, changes in the design of the ACT supply system are being made in 
Tanzania. Significant steps have been taken recently to curb any possibility of medicines 
leakage by requesting that ACT supplies are delivered by the manufacturer directly to the 
MSD (and not at the port of entry), accompanied by a manufacturer representative until 
hand over. This is in addition to changes in top management at the Dar es Salaam port 
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and Tanzania Ports Authority (Mwakyusa 2013). This path towards greater accountability 
and transparency is one that Tanzania should continue to follow and accelerate at all 
levels of the health system, including ensuring that health facility workers are equipped 
with the knowledge and capacity to complete medicines orders correctly and on time, that 
the MSD is provided with sufficient resources to deliver medicines directly to health 
facilities, and that districts are given, and trained in the use of, appropriate tools to better 
oversee trends in medicines consumption and availability in their districts.  Evidence of a 
promising shift in policy in this direction is the design of a national mHealth strategy which 
includes routine health facility data collection as part of the HIS, as well as health logistics 
monitoring and health worker communication and training modules. In addition, the MSD is 
now rolling out a direct delivery of medicines to health facilities to build a stronger contact 
with their clients.  
 
One of the consequences of irregular ACT availability in the public sector is that 
households may seek treatment for fever in the private sector. We identified the frequent 
use of private pharmacies as the first point of service when seeking treatment for fever, 
with nearly 42% of respondents seeking care in the private sector. In addition, (and the 
third key finding of this thesis) there is a high frequency of non-compliant behaviour among 
public sector health workers, usually in the form of overcharging for care and medicines 
which we calculate as an extra USD1.62 per case of fever, on average, borne by the 
household which is above the estimate USD0.98 per capita daily income level in the rural 
areas. Cumulatively, this non-compliant health worker behaviour results in an estimated 
annual cost of USD12.2 million – USD15.7 million at the national level (based on the 
number of malaria cases going to the public sector), or between 3.6%- 4.6% of total health 
expenditure on malaria in Tanzania.  Non-compliant health worker behaviour can result in 
ACT stockout in so far as health workers, through lack of training, fail to correctly order 
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medicines, thus resulting in shortages. We find that when health facilities were stocked out 
of ACT, households in their catchment area experienced an increase in direct costs of 
about one-fifth (21%) compared to those who sought treatment during an ACT stock-in 
period at their predicted health facility.  This increase in household expenditure was 
predominantly due to an increase in medicines costs experienced by about two-thirds of 
households who sought treatment from the private sector (which was found to be 19% 
more expensive than in the public sector).  
 
In summary, exploring and understanding the role of governance in the health system is 
crucial as public officials, donors and researchers strive to understand how to improve the 
performance and functioning of health systems. The results of this research have 
demonstrated that when little effort is paid to resolving issues of governance, well meaning 
interventions such as donor funding for ACT and the development of a new medicines 
supply system can fail. In order to provide some insight into potential ways to strengthen 
health system effectiveness, we first proposed a practical framework to assess 
governance in the health system.  We then explore the findings from applying the 
framework to the issue of availability of essential medicines in Tanzania, and study the 
implications of health system failures on household expenditures due to care seeking for 
fever. We find that ACT stockouts are due to both international and national governance 
and procedures, and system design failures. We strongly recommend that these are 
systematically addressed to reduce the economic burden on households of having to seek 
treatment in the more expensive and less regulated private sector. In addition, with 
Tanzania following WHO guidelines and moving away from presumptive treatment 
towards using RDTs, the complexity of having to manage an additional malaria product will 




The global financial crisis has put pressure on donor funding and, as is evident in 
Tanzania, donor funding cannot always be relied upon. With the AMFm resulting in a price 
reduction for ACT and as the economy of Tanzania continues to grow, there is no reason 
why Tanzania should not allocate a portion of its malaria budget to procure ACT 
treatments to create a buffer stock. This will require bold public policies, strong political 
leadership and a more systematic approach to medicines supply and financing, including 
possible reallocation of the health budget. Indeed, in the march towards malaria 
elimination, Tanzania may need to explore new ways to allocate funding for ACTs and 
RDTs. An interesting option might be to levy more taxes on tourists, as suggested by  Sir 
Richard Feachem  in his “Call for Action” (Feachem et al. 2010b). Even as malaria 
endemicity declines, Tanzania needs to ensure a well governed malaria programme, 
including long term planning.  Tanzania has the tools available for prevention, diagnosis 
and treatment of malaria, what is now required are strong health systems, including 
strengthening skills of workers and health professionals to deliver effective and sustained 
malaria control programmes to the poorest and more remote areas of Tanzania, based on 
the recognition that treating malaria is a public good. 
 
 Recommendations and future research Section 7.03
 
7.3.1  Recommendations for health system strengthening 
The key implication of our findings is that if health system stewards in Tanzania wish to 
improve the availability and accountability of essential medicines across the public sector, 
they will need to take a health systems perspective aimed at strengthening elements 
across all areas of the health system. We find five key implications of this research for 
health system strengthening in Tanzania: 
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1) health worker capacity needs to be addressed with regular training on ordering 
medicines and updating health facility booklets; 
2) the health information system should be simplified and reoriented so that it is able to 
capture basic data on outpatient numbers for various diseases and injuries as well as on 
births and causes of death. This might be most efficiently done using mobile phones to 
report vital events which could even provide information on vital event happening outside 
of the health facility in the community through community health workers; 
3) financing flows should allow more autonomy for health centres to be able to purchase 
medicines from qualified private supplies to prevent stockouts; 
4) the medicines delivery system should be simplified into a mixture of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ 
levers whereby medicines quantification should only happen once a year and, based on 
this quantification, regular medicines kits should be “pushed” out, factoring in an inflation 
for medicines such as antimalarials which will have seasonal variations; and 
5) accountability and transparency need to be strengthened across the system, perhaps 
by creating stronger incentives and disincentives, and by making efficient tools like SMS 
for Life open access for the public. Greater participation by health workers should also be 
facilitated in the design of the first four of these suggested areas of health systems 
strengthening, and in order to make them better aware of the health development 
advantages of strengthening the fifth.  
 
Strategies and interventions to strengthen one health system function will only be truly 
successful if thought has been given as to how these actions may influence other building 
blocks. Programs like SMS for Life have shown the potential to greatly increase 
transparency and real-time information flow yet the impact of this simple but highly 
effective initiative has not been fully appreciated by those in charge. The power of using 
mobile phones needs to be leveraged  and expanded across all essential medicines to 
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improve the accountability of resources.  Nonetheless, technology is not the entire 
solution; while text messaging can strengthen the flow of data toward the centre, it may 
not ultimately improve services unless there is regular, and relevant, feedback. Finally, as 
people play a central role in health system performance, both in terms of paying for health 
care and contributing to the need for health care, they are in effect owners of the health 
system and should be encouraged to play a larger role in the design of new interventions 
to improve it.  
 
7.3.2  Recommendations for future research 
Further research is needed to support future improvements in service delivery, to 
strengthen the evidence base for disease control and poverty reduction strategies, and to 
achieve better health outcomes. This thesis investigated the impact on household 
expenditure during an ACT stockout which is important when considering the need for 
financial protection against catastrophic health expenditure. However, we did not assess 
the indirect costs of seeking care for fever which would include the loss of income. 
Therefore, future research might consider looking into issues of income protection during 
unstable medicines supply. In addition to financial protection, another health system goal 
is improve overall levels of health. A second recommendation of this thesis for further 
research is thus to better understand the health impacts of stockouts of essential 
medicines (antimalarials, antibiotics, vaccines).  For example, do stockouts increase 
incidence and mortality from malaria, especially among children? This is perhaps as 
important as information on financial effects on households in building the case for better 
disease control programs. Given the basic function of health systems to promote health 
and prevent premature death, reliable evidence about this probable effect would be a 




From a provider-perspective a key area for future research might be identifying new 
models and approaches to designing the supply of essential medicines, or new ways to 
manage the inputs and responsibilities of key stakeholders, including donors. This focus 
on system design would require a better understanding of both financial and behavioural 
factors that influence health workers and what tools could be in built into the system to 
strengthen accountability. Research into ways to improve the health information system, 
making it more transparent, increasing data quality and accessibility, and designed in a 
way that it can be automatically reconciled with other data bases, for example on the 
supply and consumption of medicines, would also strengthen the capacity of stewards of 
the health system to better manage disease control programs. 
 
 Conclusion Section 7.04
 
 
The findings of this thesis underline the importance of recognising the complexity and 
dynamics among various health system functions, and the need to take a comprehensive 
system-wide approach to analysing and improving access to essential medicines in 
Tanzania. This body of research suggests that although efforts aimed at strengthening the 
delivery of technologies such as medicines (or in other cases, bed nets and vaccines) are 
of value, to be maximally effective they need to be embedded in a well designed health 
system which includes attention to human resources, information and supply chains. More 
recently, donors such as the Global Fund and GAVI have been investing in these 
elements, but responsibility for their integration and strengthening rests with national 
governments, particularly the Ministries of Health, Finance and Education including how 
interactions between them could be strengthened under complex political pressures. 
Health system stewards, for their part, need to take a broader perspective when assessing 
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health system performance by looking at outcomes in terms of population health gains and 
distribution, improvement in service delivery, patient satisfaction and financial protection. 
But, probably the greatest challenge to health system strengthening is to embed the 
significance of health systems thinking into the planning process and daily activities of 
health system stewards, so that they understand the importance of strategic vision, 
evidence based decision making, and accountability. For, as concluded by Julio Frenk in 
2010, “without leaders, even the best designed systems will fail”. 
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2005, University of Queensland, BEcon 
2007, University of Queensland, MHEcon (Advanced) 
2013, University of Basel, PhD Epidemiology 
Language Skills: English, French, Spanish, Kiswahili 
Country Experience: Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, Madagascar, Thailand 
                                                 Contact: E-mail: inezmlopez@gmail.com  
 
Results-driven, effective Program Manager with over ten years of international health experience 
focusing on health systems and health economics. Familiarity with field work in the Pacific, Sub-
Saharan Africa and East Asia with an international health and social sector consulting group, the World 




Abt JTA (Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea)                                                    August 2013 – Present 
Monitoring and Evaluation Manager 
Leading the monitoring and evaluation activities of a large Australian-aid health program in Papua New Guinea: 
 Developing monitoring frameworks for numerous local non-governmental organizations receiving 
grants from the Australian Government 
 Providing capacity support to local monitoring and evaluation staff 
 Creating and managing a knowledge management system to capture all reporting 
 
Merck Serono (Geneva, Switzerland)                 April 2012 – June 2013                                                                                                     
Program Manager  
Overseeing and coordinating the Access to Health function within the Global Health Department of the 
pharmaceutical company Merck Serono: 
 Developing a pilot study to assess supply chains in Africa and how they could be strengthened 
 Elaborating a tiered pricing strategy to increase access to medicines in low and lower-middle income 
countries  
 Designing a monitoring and evaluation platform to assess ‘Access to Health’ initiatives across the 
company 
 Representing the company in various industry association meetings and global health forums 
 
The World Bank (Washington DC, USA) August 2007 - March 2009 
Junior Professional Associate 
Rotating experience across different functions in the Health, Nutrition and Population Unit, including: 
 Madagascar health portfolio  
Team member of the World Bank mission to Madagascar to assess the status of the health system and 
the impact of World Bank-funded programs, particularly those related to HIV. Collaborated on the 
design of a results-based financing (RBF) pilot to increase immunization 
 Monitoring & Evaluation  
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Core member of the Monitoring & Evaluation team reporting to senior management on status of the 
health portfolio 
 Health equity data evaluation study 
Collaborated on a multi-country analysis of microeconomic inequalities in health service (public and 
private) utilization 
 Global Monitoring Report 2009, Chp 3 
Co-authored chapter on the contribution of the private sector in health towards attaining the 
Millennium Development Goal targets 
 Cambodian health information system  
Contributed to an analysis of the health information system in Cambodia and the role of the Health 
Metrics Network  
 
Abt JTA (Brisbane, Australia)       February  - July 2006 
Research Assistant 
Contributed to an AusAid funded project on HIV in Papua New Guinea:  
 Analysed costing data for community health centres in Papua New Guinea  
 Estimated costs of HIV treatment as an input to the medium term expenditure figures 
 
Ministry of Public Health, Thailand (Bangkok, Thailand)                    November 2005 - January 2006 
Research Assistant  
Collaborated on a multi-institution project assessing trends in under-five mortality according to income and 
household assets for Thailand using 1990 and 2000 census data – funded by the Wellcome Trust, UK 
 
Queensland Centre for Population Research (Brisbane, Australia)    June - October 2005                                 
Research Assistant  





The University of Basel 
Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute – SwissTPH (Basel, Switzerland)     April 2009 – July 2013 
Ph.D. Epidemiology   
Thesis title: Health System Governance in Tanzania: How does it impact service delivery in the public sector? 
Supervisors: Prof. Don de Savigny, SwissTPH and Dr. David Evans, WHO 
See section on publications   
Courses taken: Health Technology Assessment and Economic Evaluation; Health Planning in Low Income 
Countries; Inequalities in Health and Health care; Health Policy and Politics; Epidemiological concepts; 
Epidemiological methods.  
 
University of Queensland (Brisbane, Australia)  July 2005 - June 2007                              
Master of Health Economics (Advanced) 
Thesis title: Determinants of health and avoidable health inequalities.  Modeling cross-national data to investigate the 
influence of a series of variables including living standards, socioeconomic status, human capital and health 
interventions on health levels and inequalities.  
 
University of Queensland (Brisbane, Australia)  July 2002 - June 2005                            








 Selected as finalist in the ‘Young Voices in Research for Health’ 2011 competition – Global Forum for Health 
Research  
 Selected to join the World Bank Junior Professional Associate program 2007 
 Dean’s commendation list for high achievement, Faculty of Business, Economics and Law, University of 
Queensland, 2007 
 Dean’s honour roll, Faculty of Business, Economics and Law, University of Queensland, 2005 





 Fluent in English, excellent knowledge of French, basic knowledge of Spanish and Swahili 
 Fully proficient in Microsoft Office,  the data analysis and statistical software Stata, and GIS Mapping 
platform ArcGIS 
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Ljubljana: Centre of Excellence in Finance, pp 23- 45 
 ‘Towards a new approach for assessing Health Systems Governance’. Presentation at the Global Health 
Forum, Geneva, April 2010 
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avoid anti-malarial medicine stock-outs in an era of funding partners: the case of Tanzania ’ (accepted by Malaria 
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Additional Courses Completed 
 E-learning course on Reproductive Health: from Advocacy to Action 2. The World Bank Institute. 6th 
February  – 19th March, 2014 
 
 
